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Abstract
This thesis is based on the author's seven-month internship based in the gears machining
module of the Saturn Powertrain, Transmission Manufacturing plant. This module has
four primary functional areas with buffers between each. Variable setup times, complex
part flow paths, and unpredictable equipment downtime have complicated gear
production since its inception in 1990. Scheduling and material flow related issues were
a large source of the relativity poor performance in gears machining as it was a leading
cause of downtime in the Powertrain plant, which often translated to downtime to the
powertrain customer, general assembly.
This project aimed to eliminate scheduling deficiencies by implementing material and
information flow improvements and beginning setup time reduction. The material and
information flow improvements involved a CONWIP-like (CONstant WIP) approach to
inventory control. As part of the plant's kaizen process, the setup time reduction
activities were intended to begin run size reductions as an enabler for future material and
information flow simplification and better achievement of the manufacturing system's
objectives. As outlined herein, once run size reductions are achieved, the next step for
this facility should be toward a simpler system using kanban with standard-work-in-
process.
The work of this project resulted in significant improvements, as measured by the
facility. In addition, the project provided invaluable lessons for the author which were
both technical and people/leadership related.
Thesis Supervisors:
Professor David S. Cochran, Department of Mechanical Engineering
Professor Roy E. Welsch, Sloan School of Management
Rodney Black, Saturn Corp. (General Motors Corp.)
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1. Introduction
1.1. Saturn Corporation
Saturn Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of General Motors. Saturn was started
in 1982 as a "small car project" to design an American vehicle that could beat the
Japanese in the small-car race. The project evolved into a joint GM-UAW Study Center
to explore new approaches to building small cars in the United States. These efforts
culminated as the first Saturn vehicle was driven off the assembly line by GM Chairman
Roger B. Smith and UAW President Owen Bieber on July 30, 1990.
After nearly 10 years of operation, Saturn has grown to include 2 manufacturing
operations and 2 product platforms with further expansion of the product line currently
underway. The S-series small-cars are produced in Spring Hill, Tennessee, while the new
L-series (for larger Saturn) mid-size cars are produced in Wilmington, Delaware. The
Spring Hill site is preparing for a new Saturn sport-utility platform, which will launch in
2001, and the next generation of the S-series small cars in 2002.
1.2. Saturn Spring Hill Site
The Spring Hill site is approximately 2350 acres and includes:
* Powertrain. Supplies the engine/transmission assembly to Vehicle Systems.
" Body Systems. Supplies painted spaceframes and panels to Vehicle Systems.
* Vehicle Systems. Assembles the final vehicle and molds some trim pieces, in-house.
* Saturn Service Parts Operations. Distributes service parts to Saturn retailers.
* Northfield. Central office for Sales, Service & Marketing; Corporate
Communications; Finance; etc..
The site employs 8034 team members and its manufacturing operations run two 10-hour
shifts, 6 days a week. The typical daily shift schedule operates with 1st shift from
6:00am-4:00pm and 2"d shift from 4:30pm-2:30am, which allows an 1/2-hour gap between
shifts in the afternoon and a 3 -hour gap between shifts in the morning. This operating
pattern differs across areas of the site, though. For example, the gear machining area
operates with no gap between shifts in the afternoon, and a 4-hour gap in the morning.
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Three crews rotate through the schedule, each working four 10-hour days per week. The
operations include 4.68 million square feet of manufacturing floor space which is situated
on an engineered rock pad approximately 1 mile long and %2 mile wide covering 320
acres. (Saturn Corporate Communications, 1999)
1.3. Saturn Powertrain
Saturn Powertrain is a Saturn business unit reporting through the Saturn organization
rather than the GM Powertrain group, as do other GM powertrain facilities. The plant
does maintain loosely defined ties with the GM Powertrain group which are realized, in
part, through a workforce comprised of individuals with previous GM Powertrain
experience. Recently, new plant leaders have come from elsewhere in the GM
Powertrain organization. For example, the Business Unit Team Leader (plant manager)
was formerly operations manager at a GM Powertrain plant in St. Catharines, Ontario and
the Transmission Manufacturing Leader was a former plant manager at a GM Powertrain
facility in Virginia.
The plant is divided into 2 manufacturing areas: transmission and engine. The engine
portion of the plant includes lost-foam casting of engine blocks, heads, crankshafts, and
differential casings; automated machining lines; and an engine assembly line. The
transmission facility includes die-casting operations and automated machining lines for
the transmission cases and clutch housings, machining operations for gear and shaft
manufacturing, and a transmission assembly line with some sub-assembly operations.
The Spring Hill Saturn Powertrain plant supplies powertrains for only the S-series Saturn
small cars and builds both a performance and base powertrain with an automatic and
manual transmission combination for each. The base engine is a 1.9-liter single-
overhead-cam 8-valve 4-cylinder (100 hp) while the performance engine is a 1.9-liter
double-overhead-cam 16-valve 4-cylinder (124 hp). The transmissions include a base
and performance version of both a 5-speed manual and 4-speed automatic. This same
powertrain generation has been built in the Spring Hill plant since its inception; however,
this generation has a limited lifetime as it will be replaced when the entirely new S-series
platform launches in model year 2003.
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With a 2 -year life on its current product, the powertrain facility is currently vying for
future business for the next generation S-series or other work for General Motors. The
facility has no future product commitment, at this time; therefore, Saturn Powertrain is
very focused on improving its performance in order to be more competitive for future
business. The Saturn Powertrain facility actually scores poorly when measured directly
against other GM Powertrain plants according to GM's Global Powertrain Scorecard,
SQRCP (Safety, Quality, Responsiveness, Cost, and People) Performance Summary.
These scorecards are intended to provide line by line comparisons across multiple
facilities. However, direct comparisons across plants can be difficult due to varying
system designs.
For example, the Saturn transmission plant's score for parts-per-million of discrepant
material found at general assembly lags behind other GM Powertrain plants. However,
since the Saturn powertrain plant is immediately adjacent to the assembly plant, dynamic
testing was never incorporated at the powertrain plant and is instead done only after the
powertrain is assembled in the vehicle. In contrast, other GM facilities have significantly
more inventory between them and the assembly plants. This inventory forces them to
perform dynamic testing, which almost totally avoids letting defective powertrains out of
the powertrain plant. There are several tradeoffs in these two different approaches, as
one provides better quality to the customer and captures errors more quickly; however,
the other offers significant cost avoidance (for testing) and catches quality errors within a
longer, yet manageable timeframe. However, these tradeoffs are not explicitly captured
on the GM scorecard. In defense of the scorecard system, though, the significant finished
goods inventory difference is also reported through an "inventory turns" line. Although,
if a scorecard evaluation is performed by simply rank ordering plants, line by line,
misinterpretation results and relative "performance" is not compared because system
design differences are not considered.
With an immediate threat of no future product, the Saturn facility cannot afford to rely on
a judicious weighting of its scorecard performance (in comparison to other GM plants).
Instead, the Saturn facility is maintaining a relentless focus on improving performance
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(i.e. scorecard performance) in order to have a chance at earning future powertrain
business.
The Shingijutsu (Shingijutsu, 2000) consultants aid this emphasis on continuous
improvement. This group was hired by the GM Small Car Group Vice President to lead
"kaizen" workshops within the small car plants. At Saturn, the powertrain facility took
the lead in enlisting the consultants' support. The consultants have been leading between
one to six kaizen workshops each month since January 1999. In general, the plant has
been able to improve its bottom line performance and has started to reinvigorate the
culture of continuous improvement within the plant. Continuous Improvement has been
one of the five Saturn Values since its beginning; however, a renewed emphasis on
continuous improvement has occurred within the powertrain plant over the past year.
The major obstacle that the organization has faced with its improvement efforts has been
in keeping the improvements progressing once the consultants leave the building. The
tendency to refocus on daily "fire-fighting" is strong, but the leaders recognize this issue
and have been placing more emphasis on continual process improvement supplemented
by the workshops from the consultants.
1.4. Saturn Powertrain Organizational Structure
One of the unique features of Saturn is its union-management cooperative decision
making and shared leadership. This relationship is exemplified in the organizational
staffing structure of Saturn Powertrain. The plant top-level leadership consists of a non-
represented Business Unit Team Leader and an UAW-represented Vice President. Each
manufacturing area (Transmission and Engine) has both a non-represented and UAW-
represented Manufacturing Leader. The manufacturing leaders have Area Module
Advisor "Quad's" who report to them.
The transmission manufacturing area is divided into two modules: Rotational and
Transmission Machining/Assembly. The Rotational Module, which was the basis for this
internship project, includes shaft and gear production, maintenance, and
engineering/resources. The module is led by an Area Module Advisor "quad," or four-
person group, which includes a non-represented leader for operations and maintenance, a
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non-represented engineering leader, an UAW-represented operations leader, and an
UAW-represented maintenance leader. This leadership group then has Operational
Module Advisors pairs, who consist of a non-represented and UAW-represented leader,
who manage day to day operations and report to the Area Module Advisors. Each shift
has three Operational Module Advisor pairs which cover 1. gear production, 2. shaft
production, and 3. module-wide maintenance. The Operational Module Advisors lead the
production and maintenance teams to meet people, quality, cost, and
schedule/productivity goals. The gear production Operational Module Advisors lead the
following work units: Green Gears; Lathes, Weld Cell, and Ring Gears; Differential
Case; and Hard Grind. The shafts production Operational Module Advisors lead the Heat
Treat, Input Shafts, and Output Shafts work units. Each work unit consists of three teams
for the "A, B, and C" crews. Each team elects a team leader who serves to lead team
operations and frequently interfaces with the advisors.
1.5. Internship Project Overview
This internship project was based in the gear machining area of the Rotational Module.
The four work units primarily impacted by this project included: Green Gears; Lathes,
Weld Cell, and Ring Gears; Hard Grind; and Heat Treat. In concert with the Saturn
values, the teams comprising these work units were involved in this project by generating
ideas, hands-on support, and giving buy-in to the changes that were put in place. In most
cases, their involvement led to insights which averted problems and yielded a more
successful project; however, in some cases, the collective involvement led to decisions
which were less than optimal from an overall systems perspective. However, this
involvement and buy-in was definitely worth the time and effort, as the support of those
most closely involved resulted in a widely accepted system in which the teams have taken
some ownership.
1.5.1. Problem Statement
The gear manufacturing area is essentially a departmental/functional layout, which was
driven by system design. According to veteran engineers and tradesmen, the functional
design was forced by a tight capital budget (during original design and build) and a
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general desire to maximize equipment utilization. This functional layout drives complex
part flow that, when coupled with variability induced by equipment downtime and setups,
has led the module to struggle with scheduling gear production since inception. These
scheduling issues are rooted in material and information flow problems as scheduling is
driven by and directly impacts material and information flow. Numerous projects,
changes, and incremental improvements had occurred, but scheduling related
inefficiencies continued to plague the gears area.
1.5.2. Objectives
The overall intent of this project was to improve material and information flow in gear
production in order to better meet the primary objectives or functional requirements of
this (or any) manufacturing system. As related to the customer, the first 3 functional
requirements are to deliver products, every shift, according to the customer's needs with
the following:
" Right quantity.
" Right mix.
" Right quality.
In addition, the system had to meet system-wide functional requirements listed below:
" Show problems immediately (when & where).
" Robust to variation.
" Improvable and forces improvement.
These 6 functional requirements were intended to drive the project toward a stable system
design.
The current system can be characterized as unstable in that it created downtime to the
customer, Transmission Assembly, due to a failure in meeting the first three functional
requirements (right quantity, mix, and quality). Also, the system did not show problems
immediately as daily production requirements were unclear and shortages or
overproduction were not highlighted. In addition, the existing system was not robust to
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variation as equipment downtime regularly led to expediting of gear production to avoid
downtime to the customer.
Finally, from an overall-project perspective, one objective was to actually implement
improvements to the current system within the limited timeframe (7-month internship) in
order to assist in the facility's performance enhancement (and subsequent evaluation for
future product commitments). Another objective was to implement a system with active
involvement and support from the gear production teams and leaders in concert with
Saturn's values and to insure the system's long-term success.
1.5.3. Overall Methodology
The methodology included a two-fold approach as follows:
1. Begin setup time reduction in gear machining as an enabler for future lot size
reductions.
2. Improve the existing material and information flow to generate immediate
improvements.
The project partially succeeded in meeting the objectives; however, continuous
improvement of the implemented system must and has continued, after the author's
internship. In fact, the project methodology also included education of a multitude of
team members to help them understand the overall intent of the new scheduling system
and facilitate continuous improvement in the future. This education included initial
instruction for leaders, engineers, and operating technicians on the principles of
manufacturing system design from Professor David Cochran, a project advisor. In
addition, it involved continual education to all gear production team members, from the
author, on the manufacturing system's capabilities and the objectives and details of the
improvements.
1.6. Definitions
The following terms are defined for use in this thesis.
0 Non-represented Saturn team member. A team member who is not a member of or
represented by the United Auto Workers labor union.
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* Represented Saturn team member. A team member who is a member of or
represented by the United Auto Workers labor union.
* Disconnected flow line. "Product batches are produced on a limited number of
identifiable routings. Although routings are distinct, individual stations within lines
are not connected by a paced material handling system, so that inventories can build
up between stations" (Hopp and Spearman, 1996, pp. 9-10).
* Connected flow line. "Product is fabricated and assembled along a rigid routing
connected by a paced material handling system" (Hopp and Spearman, 1996, p. 10).
" Work In Process (WIP). Parts in the manufacturing system which have not arrived at
an inventory location (Hopp and Spearman, 1996).
" CONstant Work-In-Process (CONWIP). A pull production system that focuses on
maintaining a predefined WIP level -- ref. Section 4.2.2 for complete review. (Hopp
and Spearman, 1996).
" Scheduling Policy. "A set of rules for allocating production resources in real time"
(Gershwin, 1999).
" Takt Time. "Defines customer demand cycle time. It is the quotient of available time
per shift (day) to average demand per shift (day)" (Cochran, 1999).
* Lot Size. "Number or quantity of parts moved between operations" (Cochran, 1999).
" Run Size. Number of parts that are made before changing over (Cochran, 1999).
* Process. The author defines a process to be a collection of machines and stations
-required to perform a specified set of operations on a product or group of products.
Cochran (1999) also refers to a sub-system with an equivalent definition, but process
is used in this paper for simplicity.
" Cycle Time. "The time interval between the production of two sequential parts by a
machine or sub-system. The production rate is the inverse of cycle time" (Cochran,
1999).
* Processing Time. "The time during which material is being changed, whether it is a
machining operation or an assembly" (Cochran, 1999).
* Throughput Time. "The time required for a part to pass through the manufacturing
system. Measured from the time processing begins on raw material to the time the
processed product exits the final operation" (Cochran, 1999).
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" Setup Time. "The time required to changeover a machine, resource, work center, or
line from the last good piece of part type A to the first good piece of part type B"
(Cochran, 1999).
" Work-In-Process (WIP). "The total inventory existing within a manufacturing
system. Does not include raw materials and components prior to the first operation in
the system or finished goods after the initial operation" (Cochran, 1999).
" Standard Work-In-Process. "A constant amount of WIP that is designed in between
manufacturing sub-systems or operations. SWIP uncouples variation and established
a set-point inventory level between operations" (Cochran, 1999).
1.7. Thesis Structure
This thesis begins with the introductory chapter to provide the background for Saturn,
Saturn Powertrain and its organizational structure, and the internship project. The Gear
Manufacturing System Details chapter provides more detailed information about the
specific project site and its initial state. Then, the Setup Time Reduction chapter includes
the setup and details of the first primary component of the internship, setup time
reduction activities. The second major component of the internship is covered in the
Material and Information Flow Improvements chapter through a detailed explanation of
the methodology, implementation, and results. Finally, the Conclusions chapter provides
the high-level lessons of this internship, and the Next Steps chapter gives a summary of
"why" and "where" the organization should next focus.
2. Gear Manufacturing System Details
2.1. Major Processes
As mentioned, the primary area of focus for this project was specifically in the gears
machining area. Figure 2-1 shows the process flow for gear machining with a distinction
between the process flow for automatic versus manual gears. There are buffers, as
shown, between each process. The overall process structure can be viewed as a
disconnected flow line; however, within a given process (e.g. green gears or weld cell)
the structure resembles a connected flow line. The overall routing includes Lathe and
Green Gears, Weld Cell, Heat Treat, Hard Grind, and then delivery to the customer,
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Transmission Assembly. The primary distinction between automatic and manual gears is
the point at which they are processed in the weld cell. While manual gears are welded in
the second stage, automatic gears are welded as the last step prior to the customer.
Figure 2-1 Simplified Process Flow Diagram for Gears Machining
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Green Gears
Forgings (from Supplier)
# Lines = 10
Cycle Time = 55s/gear/line
Setup (major/minor) = 60130min
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# Batch Furnaces = 8
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Throughput Time = 10hour/load
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Heat Treat
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Legend
.-" Automa
Manual
W- Process
Buffer/i
Note: all cycle and setup times are estimates of overall averages across all lines within a process.
There are thirty different gear types which serve both manual and automatic
transmissions. Gears are typically divided into part families which serve the same
transmission gear, but are a different ratio to serve both base and performance models.
For example, the 4 th gear manual family includes the 4 th gear base manual and 4 th gear
performance manual, which differ only in ratio. Setup times are long on most lines.
These can be distinguished between major and minor setups. Major setups are those
which convert from one gear to another in different families, while minor setups switch
from one gear to another within the same family. Minor changeovers involve relatively
low work content and time, while major changeovers, from one part to another in a
different family, are much more involved and time consuming.
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The gears are transferred between process lines on carts which are typically dedicated to
a given part type once loaded. Cart sizes range from 144 to 720 gears per cart for
standard gears (i.e. excluding ring gears) which equates to 5 to 50 hours of gears. For
example, a full cart of gear type 1551 holds 240 gears which equates to 6 hours of
demand for this part type. The buffers, between the different stages, have dedicated lanes
assigned to each part type and hold between one to twelve carts, depending on part type
and area. The gears are loaded on to carts in one of the following dunnage types:
" Plastic, robotic trays. These can be automatically loaded/unloaded by robot.
" Wire baskets. Used to transfer parts between areas where manual load or unload is
necessary.
" Alloy trays. Trays for parts to be heat treated. These trays are a special alloy
composition which accommodates the heat treat process.
The dunnage locates the gears on posts in the inner diameter to prevent adjacent gears
from contacting during transfer. The dunnage trays/baskets can hold between nine to
forty gears each. A maximum of twenty trays/baskets can be loaded on a cart.
2.1.1. Green Gears
The green gears machining process is defined as such because the gears are in the
"green," pre-heat treat, state. The lathes are essentially an integral part of the green gears
area but are indicated in Figure 2-1 because the lathes operators are part of a different
team. The green gears machining process begins with forgings from outside suppliers.
The forgings are cut on the lathes to a basic inner and outer diameter, then proceed
through the cut, chamfer/debur, and shaving steps to finish the gear teeth. The gear teeth
are not machined after this step for all gears except the extremely large ring gear.
The green gears area is broken down into 9 different lines which consist of a series of
machining equipment (lathe, hob, chamfer, shaver) connected by conveyor with robots
transferring parts from the belt conveyor to/from each machine. The maximum WIP for
a typical green gears line from start (lathes) to the end of the line, excluding the post-
process buffer, can be as much as 100 parts. Each line consists of 2 operators: 1 lathe
operator to load the line with forgings and maintain the lathes, and 1 operator to unload
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the line and maintain the other equipment. The individual lines run between 2 to 4
different part types. In the case of 4-part lines, 2 of the types are typically a family of
manuals gears while the other 2 are a family of auto gears. A minor setup on a typical
line may take 20 minutes while a major setup on the same line would take 70 minutes.
There are a few primary issues for the green gears area. Getting enough parts from the
lathes is a primary issue, as the lathes are the bottleneck of the process due to slow cycle
times (i.e. lathe cycle times average 55 seconds versus 48 seconds for next slowest
machine on the same green gears line) and downtime. Lengthy changeovers and the
inability to perform changeovers when necessary are primary issues with green gears,
also.
2.1.2. Weld Cell
Some manual and auto gears don't require welding, but for the welded gears, the weld
"cell" is the 2 process step for manual gears and the last step for auto gears. A ring gear
(from an outside supplier) is laser-welded to the manual gears and a hub (from an outside
supplier) is laser-welded to the automatic gears. The weld cell parts go through a wash
cycle, then proceed to the bum-box for welding, are deburred, and finally are washed
again. The weld cell is composed of 2 lines, "A" and "B." Each line is automated with
operator loading and unloading of trays of gears, as opposed to handling individual gears
(as in other areas), required at each end. The part transfer is accomplished by belt
conveyors with some robotic handling at each end of the process. The maximum WIP for
a weld cell line is approximately 100 parts. Each line is usually staffed with 1 operator to
maintain the equipment and to load/unload the line. The "A" line is equipped to run all
automatic gears and the "B" line can run either manual or automatic gears. This equates
to 7 different gear types for the "A" line and 15 different gear types for the "B" line. The
weld cell changeover times are significantly less than the gear machining equipment. A
typical minor changeover takes approximately 9 minutes, while a major changeover takes
20 minutes.
The weld cell cycle times are very short and the primary issues for the weld cell are part
availability from upstream processes and very infrequent, but sometimes extremely
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lengthy, laser welding equipment downtime. Although, the potential downtime issues are
lessened by a backup laser which is intended to provide "flip of a switch" backup
capability.
2.1.3. Heat Treat
The heat treat process flow is differentiated primarily for oil-quench versus air-quench
parts. Oil quench parts are routed through heat, oil-quench, wash, temper, shot peen,
wash, and roll-check, while air quench parts go through heat, air-quench, quench-press,
wash, temper, shot peen, wash, and roll-check. This entire heat treat process takes
approximately 8 to 10 hours for oil quench parts and 10 to 12 hours for air quench parts.
Contrary to oil-quench parts, the air-quench parts are larger gears which tend to distort
during heating. The slower air-quench is followed by heating and pressing (quench
press) which essentially presses the flatness back into the gear.
The heat treat process is a case hardening process, involving alteration of only the surface
properties, to improve resistance to surface indentation, fatigue, and wear while
maintaining toughness. It begins with the carburizing process where parts are heated to
1675 degrees Fahrenheit in an inert atmosphere, then methane gas is introduced to react
with the steel and drive carbon into the surface. The heating process is followed by
quench to create compressive residual stresses at the surface; then tempering is used to
reduce brittleness, increase ductility and toughness, and reduce residual stresses
(Kalpakjian, 1995). Shot-peening is performed last to again produce compressive
residual stresses at the surface in order to improve fatigue life.
Heat treat processes 30 different gear types and 5 different shaft types through 8 batch
furnaces (as opposed to continuousflow furnaces). The furnaces are box furnace
(Kalpakjian, 1995) type where the part batches are transferred into the furnace via rails
and a flatcar, which is divided into quadrants (ref. Figure 2-2). The different quadrants
can generally be loaded with different part types, within certain general process
constraints; although, shafts and large ring gears are processed together (i.e. in all 4
quadrants) due to mass and heat distribution issues. As Figure 2-2 illustrates, each
quadrant includes a stack of alloy trays. These stacks are typically one cart's worth of
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alloy trays (i.e. 8-13 trays). Each stack/quadrant typically consists of the same part type
(due to handling/ergonomics issues created with mixed stacks of several different part
types); therefore, the minimum run size for a given part type is typically 1 quadrant
which equates to 1 full, alloy cart or 4 to 50 hours of demand. Heat treat has essentially
no significant setup times.
Figure 2-2 Heat Treat Furnace Load Illustration
Single quadrant
(with multiple
alloy trays)
Flatcar
The primary issues for heat treat are equipment downtime, especially with quench press
equipment and furnaces, maintaining part flow within the heat treat process, and part
availability. The heat treat motto of "you make 'em, we'll bake 'em" is generally true for
the furnaces; however, heat treat's equipment breakdown issues and tendency to let carts
of gears accumulate prior to shot-peen can lead to stagnation of part flow. In addition,
the large minimum run sizes and long 10-hour heat treat cycle become significant when
parts reach low inventory levels. However, in cases of imminent downtime, heat treat
can mix quadrants, as mentioned, in order to go below the typical minimum run size.
The run size also becomes troublesome if an entire heat treat load is scrapped due to a
quality issue, which is sometimes caused by equipment failure. Load mixing, to keep run
sizes of individual part types at a maximum of 1 or 2 quadrants of a given load, is done to
circumvent this risk.
2.1.4. Hard Grind
Hard Grind performs finish grinding on hardened gears (post-heat treat). The hard grind
area consists of 3 main conveyor lines with manual load at one end and a wash operation
followed by manual unload at the other end. In between, the parts are loaded and
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unloaded from the conveyor by robots to small belt conveyors which automatically
service individual grinding machines. The maximum WIP for any given part in Hard
Grind is approximately 200 parts with a full conveyor system. Each conveyor line
services 5 to 6 grinders. Most parts must be processed on 2 different grinders for 1st and
2 " stage grinding. For example, a 1 't operation grinder might finish grind the inner
diameter and front face, while the 2nd operation grinder would finish grind the back face.
The grinders are typically staffed with 1 operator on each 1st operation grinder. These
operators load and unload parts, attend to the 2nd operation grinders, and perform setups.
In total, the hard grind area has about 10 direct (allocated to a direct production job,
versus team leader or other) operators per crew/shift.
Grinders run between 2 and 4 part types with major and minor changeovers to convert
from one part to another. The 1st and 2 "d operation must be setup at the same time to run
the same part type. However, in-process parts on the conveyor between the 1st and 2"n
operation grinders provide some buffer to allow "running changeovers." A "running
changeover" consists of performing the changeover on the first grinder while the second
is still processing parts from the last run. Changeover times vary from fifteen minutes to
ninety minutes on individual grinders and as a net, last good part to first good part, for the
overall first and second operation changeover.
The primary issues for hard grind are part availability from upstream processes and
equipment downtime. The lack of parts forces frequent changeovers in order to avoid
downtime to the customer, and changeover errors can sometimes lead to extended
downtime or scrap. However, due to its close proximity to the customer, any Hard Grind
downtime receives immediate attention.
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2.2. Customer Demand
The transmission assembly demand and associated takt times for transmissions are shown
in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1 Transmission Demand and Takt Times
Style Required per Day (units) Takt Time (seconds)
Base Automatic 357 183
Performance Automatic 420 155
Base Manual 179 366
Performance Manual 94 691
Total 1050 62
Demand is relatively stable as total daily demand is fixed for extended periods of time
and the mix of different models varies only to a limited degree. Although, the model mix
variation is typically marked near the end of the model year, as forecasts and final
demand are leveled.
The total daily demand and associated 62 second takt time is most relevant to most of the
gear production equipment because numerous machines run a total combination of parts
which equals the total daily demand. For example, a 4-part line or machine would
typically run a base automatic, performance automatic, base manual, and performance
manual gear type. A 3-part line might run a base/performance automatic gear, which is
identical for base and performance transmissions, a base manual, and a performance
manual gear type. However, there are exceptions to this as some equipment runs multiple
different gears, which are required on the same transmission type.
2.3. Detailed Product Flow Example
Figure 2-3 provides a detailed example of the complexity of part flow paths in the gear
machining area and includes takt times, cycle times, and setup times for each line. The 3
part types represented are produced on a given line in green gears. However, once these
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gears leave the green gears area, the flow paths for the manual and automatic gears
diverge considerably. The functional layout of gear machining area is illustrated through
Figure 2-3 as the equipment layout and part-machine assignments are clearly not based
on product flow. As these parts move through the system they are run across equipment
that handles multiple other part types, which were produced on other green gears lines.
For example, the weld cell lines each manage 6 other part types, at a minimum (the "B"
line can actually run all 15 welded parts). The part-machine assignments also create part
flow complexity within a given process area. The BT1222 second operation grinder runs
3 parts total, 2 of which are not run across the same 1st operation grinder (BT1234) as the
other (part type 1551). This effectively couples the scheduling decisions for 2 different
I't operation grinders because of the shared 2nd operation grinder.
Figure 2-3 Detailed Process Flow Example
(with Takt Times, Cycle Times, and Setup Times)
Green Gear s = 62s
CT =5s
6 other 1A Setup = 60mm
part types---,,
Weld Cell TT = 29sCT = 24s
BSetup = 23m'n
32 other
part types
Heat Treat
(batch furnaces)
2 other
part types---.,
Hard Grind
BT1238
Hard Grind
BT1224
I other
part type
T = 62 Hard Grind -V=6,sCT=pC = sT=51sSetup = 38min BT1234 Setup = 81in
2- other
part types
TT = 62s T 2CT = 32s Hard Grind T 2CT = 23s
Setup =22min B12 Setup = 0mmn
6 other
part types
Weld Cell TT = 29s
CT = 24s
Setup 23min
Legend
* 1551 (Auto)
... > 0332 (Base Man)
1191 (Perf. Man)
Other part types
TT (Takt Time)
CT (Cycle Time)
- other
part type
Hard Grind TT = 62sCT = 30sBT1249 Setup =20min
Transmission Assembly
Note: this figure does not show buffers between processes and the capability of the weld cell "B" lane to
run the automatic gears for simplicity.
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2.4. Initial Material Replenishment Method
Since the start of Saturn Powertrain the method of material replenishment has been
revamped continuously. It started with scheduling boards and kanban cards, changed to a
material flow sheet, temporarily consisted of a regular patterned build schedule, then
went back to the material flow sheet (as it was upon start of this project). The material
flow sheet (shown in Figure 2-4) was a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet which had inventory
counts for all the processes and some statistics on total inventory in the system ("days in
the system") and inventory available to the customer ("hours from grind"). The sheet was
printed at the start of each shift, after material flow point people for each major process
entered inventory counts. These counts were entered through an intranet based database
system from which the material flow sheet pulled these numbers. Also, customer
demand data (while relatively stable) is similarly pulled from a database to automatically
generate demand based statistics.
The material flow sheet was the sole tool used to decide what to run in each area. By
reviewing inventory availability and the summary statistics, for some areas, each team or
operator decided what parts to produce. This method to decide what to run actually
varied across manufacturing processes and even across teams or crews within the same
process. For example, in green gears, the "C" crew material flow point person would
decide what to run on each line in green gears based on a "C" crew material flow meeting
which included representatives from all processes. However, on "B" crew there was no
material flow meeting between all processes and within green gears the individual
operators on each line would decide what to run.
While this approach allowed complete autonomy to the teams and crews and to the
operators, in some cases, it caused extreme inconsistencies across crews. For example,
"C' crew might typically changeover a green gears line when a parts system inventory
was down to 3 "days in the system." However, a "B" crew operator might let the same
part get down to 2 days in the system before starting to run this part.
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Figure 2-4 Original Material Flow Sheet
ROTATIONAL GEARS MODULE: AUTOMATIC BA= 357 PA 495 TOTAL= 852 .09109 1999 4I22000 7:15 PNI Wednesday%-FC W . e
PERF BASE P/ B P/ B B ' P B P P/B P B B P P/B P B P/ B P/B
GREEN LN EA B 3A A 3B 3B 5A 5B 5B 2A 2A 2B 4 4 RGEARDCASE
FARIT51 1554 1788 3562 2562 3230 3232
NUMBER 3 2 6 _ 2 2 1228"8 P95 645- k5WI j6J3 j2JI 3 2531 2754
LATE KANBAN 295 145 2 133 46 268 200 96 56 40 72 18 58
GREEN KANBAN 315 1800 880 660 900 1550 1000 600 400 660 2640 2145 1440 1100
KB SIZE 0/ 2835 0 2935 0 /1110 0/ 2200 0/ 1260 0 2205 0 /2340 0 /1170 0 i 975 0/ 910o 0/ 2640 0 /2475 0/ 2160 0/1260 0 9900 0 /600
I/P-AFC 315 220 440 ISO 720
I/P-QPS 720 720 195 '2j 495 /1 0
HEAT I/P-PEEN 630 440 880 195 195 165 360
TREAT I/P ROLL 195 965
KANAN 1260 2205 660 315 1575 390 440 1980 1620 540 90
KB SIZE 0/ 2935 0 12935 0 /1110 0/ 2200 9/ 1260 0 2205 0 /2340 0 /1170 0/ 975 0/1100 __ /2640 0/ 2475 G/ 2160 0 /1260 360/ 1800 NIA
Inventory counts UNE/MACH 1-1234 5-1239 1-1236 1-1236 1-1235 1-1235 5-1232 1-1229 1-1229 2-1238 2-1238 5-1227/8 4-1237 2-1237
(quantity of gears in HRD 1/P 125 210 264 147 22 1 TOWERGRND I/P P 127 280 0 264 177 223 T60WERdifferent processes) ca / 04 728 172KANAN 720 720 480 1428 349 1146 864 432 476 486 433 288
K9 SIZE 0/ 2835 0/ 2835 0/ 999 0/ 2200 0/ 1260 0/ 1440 0 /2340 0 /1170 0 /975 0 91100 1 / 2640 0 / 2475 0/ 2160 0/ 1260 NIA N/A
li/p 72
HARD I/P-COMP. 156
WELD 480 478 896 192 568 760 382
KB SIZE 0/2135 0/ 2160 0 / 1260 0 / 890 0/ 2200 1 0/ 2205 WA NA
I/P Days remaining this week: 25 TOTAL GEARS- 50 668
HARD I/P-CONF 155 PULL RATE PER HOUR
-TURN KAMBAN 1944 BA- 17.85 ALL ALTOS= 42.6
KB SIZE 0 / 2335 PA- 24. 75
kT ASSEMBLY 89 574 122 25 270 24 360 306 42 51 49 334 21 183
rOTAL FINISHED AVAIL. 2033 1294 600 921 462 592 709 1452 906 483 524 820 781 565 2270
Summary statistics EQ'DTHISWEEK 2130 2130 893 1238 893 1238 2130 1238 893 193 1238 2130 1238 893 2130 2130
for the overall REOD NEXT WEEK 7242 7242 3035 4208 3035 4208 7242 4208 3035 3035 4208 7242 4208 3035 7242 7242
system (in quantity OTALINSYSTEM 6348 5299 2780 4769 2031 3717 3209 2967 1779 2341 5144 3965 4434 1885 2270DAYS IN S STEM 7.5 6.2 17.8 9.6 5.7 7.5 13.8 6.0 5.0 16.6 10.4 4.7 9.0 5.3 12.66
of gears, unless OURSFROMORIND 47.7 30.4 33.6 37.2 25.9 23.9 16.6 58.7 50.8 27.1 21.2 19.2 31.6 31.7
otherwise noted) 6RRENTSHORT -97 -836 -292.5 -316.5 -430.5 -646 -1421 215 14 -410 -714 -1310 -457 -328 140 -2130
HORTTHISWEEK 4218 3169 1888 3532 1139 2480 1079 1730 887 1449 3907 1835 3197 993 140 -2130
HORTNEXT WEEK -894 -1943 -255 562 -1004 -491 -4033 -1241 -1256 -694 937 -3277 227 -1150 -4972 -7242
P1ARTI UN HULL
Note: automatic gears sheet shown, manual gears sheet similar
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This same practice was common at the other end of the gear manufacturing system as
hard grind, which preceded the customer on all manual gears, had similar inconsistencies
across crews. Some operators would let part inventory levels go down to 3 "hours from
grind" (i.e. hours of parts available to assembly, the customer) before starting to
changeover, while others would start a changeover at 10 or 15 hours.
At either end of the system, these variances were exposing the entire area to extreme risk
for shutting down the customer, especially if coupled with any equipment or quality
failures in the process. Also, in a system which was so complex and closely coupled (as
mentioned under the Detailed Product Flow Example), additional variation in decision
making only compounded its problems.
3. Setup Time Reduction
3.1. Goals
The setup time reduction activities had started in other areas of the powertrain plant,
before the author's internship, as just one aspect of the kaizen effort, which the entire
plant had underway. Setup time reduction in gear machining started as a result of a
kaizen workshop, for which the author was the Saturn team leader, led by a Shingijutsu
consultant. The workshop was initially intended to focus solely on material flow, but the
consultant steered the group in a different direction to focus on the changeover time for a
grinder in Hard Grind. The consultants change of course for the group reveals much
about the goals of setup time reduction. It is a key foundation of the Toyota Production
System (TPS) as it was originally recognized by Ohno as a way to reduce the stock of
finished and intermediate products through small run sizes (Monden, 1993). Therefore,
before trying to improve material flow, Toyota would first focus on setup time reduction
in order to make the process capable of meeting the ultimate goal (run and lot sizes of 1).
In gear machining, the setup time reduction activities are intended to generally provide
more flexibility for the organization. As one leader in the area mentioned, the additional
flexibility can be translated to run-size reductions or to allow completion of preventative
maintenance activities during production hours (keeping run sizes constant). However,
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leaving run sizes fixed would conflict with the key advantage to run size reduction, as
explained through TPS. The smaller run sizes are intended to provide better quality and
less waste in the production system. Also, contrary to popular belief (of most operators
in Saturn gear machining), part of the goal with TPS is that smaller run sizes actually
drive better quality by forcing improvement in and more repetitive changeovers. The
metaphor commonly used is one of "lowering the water level in the river in order expose
the rocks (problems) underneath" (Shingijutsu, 1998, p. 11). By establishing "lower
water levels" (less inventory) the smaller run sizes force better changeovers by reducing
problem detection intervals.
As a resource to the organization, the author's primary intent with setup time reduction
was to first enable smaller run sizes. Then, once the smaller run sizes were enabled it
would become the author's next goal to "sell" the organization on using this flexibility for
smaller run sizes. The reason for the need to "sell" reduced run sizes was primarily due
to issues of production team autonomy not leadership disagreement. The leadership,
especially at the plant-wide level, was very supportive of reduced run sizes, but the
teams, per the Saturn/UAW contract, are empowered to determine their production
schedule (what to produce and when to produce it) and are naturally against run size
reductions. Therefore, the primary issue was in "selling" the changes to the teams since
they controlled their production schedule and had to directly absorb the (perceived
increase in) workload of additional changeovers.
3.2. Literature Review
Numerous work has been written on setup time reduction. The brief citings below are
intended to give the sense for the overall methodology and background information.
Shingo (1989) developed the single-minute exchange of die (SMED) as a method to
improve setup and Monden (1993) provides an excellent summary of SMED in four
major concepts or steps to setup time reduction as follows:
1. Separate the internal setup from the external setup. Internal setup consists of those
setup operations which must be performed when the machine is stopped. External
setup includes the operations which can be performed while the machine is running.
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In this step, careful attention needs to be given to clearly separate external from
internal setup operations.
2. Convert as much as possible of the internal setup to the external setup. Typically
organizations fail to make the distinction between internal and external setup and
thereby perform internally, operations that could be external. Converting these
internal operations to external ones creates immediate improvements in net
changeover time.
3. Eliminate the adjustment process. As Monden states, "The process of adjustment in
the setup actions usually takes about 50 to 70 percent of the total internal setup time"
(p. 122). Therefore, reducing adjustments is critical to reducing setup time.
4. Abolish the setup step itself. Monden provides alternatives to the setup as
commonizing the product design, developing sets such that two different parts are
made together in the same "setup," and producing parts in parallel (i.e. dedicated
equipment).
The setup time reduction activities at Saturn are part of a broader kaizen effort. The
kaizen process is defined by Cochran (1999) as "a continuous overall improvement effort
with the purpose of meeting takt time with minimal resources" (p. 2). The Shingijutsu
consultants (1999) maintain that standard operations are the basis of kaizen as they state:
"There can be no improvement in the absence of standards (i.e. when normal and
abnormal phenomena are undifferentiated)" (p. 5). Shingijutsu also offer 6 steps or
procedures for improving standard operations as "1. Clarify improvement needs
(objectives). 2. Observe the status quo and use charts to express standard operations. 3.
Identify problems based on the status quo (find waste). 4. Resolve problems and prevent
recurrence. 5. Construct new standard work sheets. 6. Constant repetition of steps 1-5"
(p. 7). Also, they offer a quick reference for kaizen as "Quick and crude is better than
slow and fancy! No action means no results" (p. 16).
Consultants from the Toyota Supplier Support Center (TSSC) also offer insight into
kaizen as they explain it as "the continued pursuit to close the gap between the current
state and True North." They also define True North as "0 defects, 100% value-added,
and lxI (lot and run sizes of 1) on demand, in sequence." They essentially relate the
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pursuit of True North and moving from the "current condition" to this state as the essence
of TPS. They also provide an exemplary framework for considering kaizen (shown in
Figure 3-1). This illustration incorporates the dynamic development of human resources
and process improvement (both magnitude and speed).
Figure 3-1 TSSC's Depiction of Kaizen
Key Lessons:
* Human development improves
(size increase) over time with more
kaizen experience.
* Speed increases as human
development occurs.
* Steps or magnitude of
improvement activities increases
Scope with human development.
Time
Adapted from Toyota Supplier Support Center (1999).
These references establish the basic framework for both setup time reduction and kaizen.
They illustrate consistent points about standardization as a basis for improvement efforts
and the pursuit of an ideal state (as in TPS's True North). Progressing toward this state
proves much more difficult, though, than citing these references, as is explained below.
3.3. Internship Experiences
As mentioned, the author's first kaizen experience was as part of a kaizen workshop
focused on setup time reduction, which was led by a Shingijutsu consultant. This was
followed by two separate workshops led by the author and targeting setup time reduction
of a line in green gears and then a grinder in hard grind. Next, the author was a
participant in a Shingijutsu-led kaizen team in the shafts area, which was targeting first-
time quality. Finally, the author led a kaizen in the weld cell focused solely on
standardization of the changeover process.
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These hands-on kaizen experiences allowed the author to learn from experts (the
Shingijutsu consultants) and practice with the tools of setup time reduction and then put
this learning to test by directly leading kaizen activities without their support. In
reviewing the overall sequence of the type of kaizen activities with which the author was
involved, one might observe that the very last, not the first, kaizen activity was solely
focused on standardization of the changeover process. This workshop was in direct
response to the shortcomings of previous activities. While significant improvement was
generally realized in changeover times during the course of the kaizen event, further
monitoring of changeover times showed only slight improvements. The cause was
attributed to lack of standardization and uniform training of operators on the changeover
methods, after the kaizen.
One might ask why this issue occurred since the text citings mentioned earlier indicate
that standardization is essential even before improvement can occur (i.e. differentiate
abnormal from normal, then improve it). However, the avoidance of standardization can
be attributed to the author's decision to prudently "pick his battles," after significant
resistance from operators on the kaizen teams. The operators clearly stated that they
wanted no part of the kaizen process, if it was about creating a standardized method for
changeovers. Their reasoning was coupled to a primary issue of not wanting to be held
accountable. In many ways, this fear was indirect, as they were concerned that their team
members would perceive standardization as a way to hold the operators accountable and
then the operators would blame their respective kaizen team representative. There was
also a secondary reason for the resistance to standardization in that the operators didn't
view standardization as necessary for a changeover process. As one stated, "Yes, it's
important for assembly work, but not for the changeover of a machine. Everyone has his
own method that he's comfortable with and that's okay. They're set in their ways,
anyway, because many of them have been doing it that way for 10 years." This statement
gets to another primary root of the standardization resistance as people don't want to
"change their ways."
After this resistance was clearly stated, to the author, it became a choice of pursuing
changeover improvements without a rigorous standardization focus or abandoning the
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workshop, altogether. The author chose the 1st option and then with the operators'
support, the kaizen team provided a review with each production team after the event to
explain the changes. In this way, the team attempted to inform everyone about necessary
operating changes without specifically addressing the standardized method issue.
This standardization resistance issue might cause one to question the role of leadership in
implementing/mandating standardized methods. The leadership supported
standardization of changeovers from both the management and UAW leadership sides.
However, leaders were in a difficult position because, while standardization was
implemented in numerous areas at Saturn under a "one consistent method" requirement, it
was never required in the gear machining area for changeovers. Therefore, a sudden
change to require standardization of changeovers would have been a highly contentious
issue with the production teams. Therefore, the approach that was jointly agreed upon by
the leaders and the author was to develop a template for a changeover procedure which
would serve as a starting point for future changeover standardization.
The weld cell standardization kaizen was then used as a vehicle to establish a
standardized changeover "template" for the gear machining system. The operators for
this kaizen event were the weld cell "subject matter experts" and were asked to support
this activity with the up-front goal of standardization. Due to the weld cell's relatively
short changeover process (that was already drafted), its smaller population of operators,
and the willingness of the operator experts to support the initiative, the weld cell provided
a good starting point.
3.4. Examples
Rather than describing details on each kaizen event, the author provides the following
summary of the tools used in each step of setup time reduction and before/after
photographs of a few improvements.
3.4.1. Separate Internal Setup from External Setup
Videotaping was used in this initial step along with spaghetti diagrams. With these
primary tools the kaizen teams were able to identify internal versus external setup actions
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and the waste of an operator leaving the machine for external setup work. The spaghetti
diagrams were used at each stage of improvement (i.e. a daily changeover was performed
to gauge each day's improvement) to trace the operator work-path during the entire
changeover. As can be seen from Figure 3-2, the final ("after") diagram showed a
marked improvement as the operator had significantly less walking and never had to
leave the machine (for tools, part, or information). Shadow boards were used to stage all
changeover tools immediately at the tooling.
The Standard Work Combination sheet provided a tool for understanding the significant
portions of the setup and plotting the improvement. As shown in Figure 3-3, the before
and after procedures show an approximate 30 minute overall improvement (from 76 to 48
minutes) for a grinder changeover. Also, in standardizing the weld cell changeover
procedure the standard work combination was incorporated for both the overall procedure
timing (Figure 3-4) and for explicitly mapping the timing of the last-good-part and first-
good-part (Figure 3-5). By overlaying these two sheets, one can surmise the high
leverage points for focus in reducing the changeover time. For example, the first good
part has a definitive wait time on the changeover of the weld cell burn-box. By first
attacking this portion of the changeover and attempting to reduce this wait time, a direct
improvement in net changeover time can result. However, without defining these times,
a portion of the changeover which is "fixed" may have no impact on the true net
changeover time.
34
Figure 3-2 Spaghetti Diagrams Before/After
BEFORE
Machine/grinder perimeter
LA
/ / n
NLOP.
401
AFTER
Machine/grinder perimeter
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Figure 3-3 Improvement Shown through Standard Work Combination Sheet
Standard Work Combination
Cell Name: BT 1238 Changeover Cell Cycle Time: NA
Worker Group: WU8
work ime sec) Iperation's Time (minutes)
Seq. Work Content 30-Jun Ju 1 15 In 2 30 35 4 45 1* 15 10 65 /u /t
move head in the side of machine .1
remove quill (went for longer wrench t I1 1
replace quill
4 oil line outI in
remove chuck
-6- replace chuck
move collet head out for collet change 14. 15
s tnppers ouvin 75T 95
W collets outtin 2T6b 5 1
10 top track ajust (inside) 2s19 Mt
IT ower track (inside) 28 .1I
controller move collet head back 2Ltj 0t i
gage conroer cange base
ajust part pusher in gage 2B. *2 I
-T5 master I ajust probe in gage 60 M1I
1W ajust track below gage 2W0 -5
-f set-up parts In machine/ referance heads s71I
T atart-up to grind part (controller) 25 .Hl
rom first part cut through gage . H .1i
2U load line (trouble shoot conveyer .
2'F second part grnd through gage(off-set size. . lT1
22 third part grnd through gage(off-set size) - 1.
73 4th part grind through gage(off-set size .. i
2T 5th part grind through gage (off-set size) --- n 35 nu e
SImprovement
2UAL /b 4
min min
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Figure 3-4 Weld Cell Standard Work Combination Sheet
Part o Auto or Man Welded Gears
Process Weld Cell Changeover
Standard Work
Combination Sheet
Date Prepared 1/3/00
Work Unit WU#1 1
Quota per shift 4473
TAKT Time 30sec
Manual
Automatic
Work Work Content Cum Tin*. Time (sec) Operation's Time (minutes)
Seq. I(min) Iman IAuto Iwalk 10 12 14 16 8 110 112 114 116 118 120 122 124 126 128
Major Changeover - Operator Work Content
1 Purge and re-start 3.0 180destacker
2 Load line 3.7 40
3 Change hub riser 4.8 70
4 Remove tooling 7.5 160
5 Install tooling 10.8 200
6 Set laser 12.5 100
7 Press & weld first part 13.3 30 20
8 Wait for part to transfer to 13.9 36debur
9 Walk to Met Lab
10
11
Check part
Walk back to Weld Cell
19.8
20.6
300
12 Purge trays and load trays 23.9 200
13 Setup gage 24.4 30
50
Z4.4 2Z.4 U.3 1.7
Cum Man Auto Walk
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Figure 3-5 Weld Cell Last Good Part versus First Good Part Timing
Part No. Auto or Man Welded GearsName
Process Weld Cell Changeover
Standard Work
Combination Sheet
Date Prepared 1/3/00
Work Unit WU#1 1
Quota per shift 4473
TAKT Time 30sec
Manual Walking
Automatic Waiting
ork Work Content Cm Tim. Time (sec) Operation's Time (minutes)
Seq. W (min) Man I Auto I Walk 10 12 14 16 18 10 112 114 16 118 20 22 124 126 [28
Major Changeover - Last Good Part Timing (last good part of previous batch)
1 Last Good Part - Travel 0.4 24from end washer to welder
2 Last Good Part - weld 0.9 30
3Last ood Part -Travel 1.1 10from welder to debur
4 Last Good Part - debur 1.4 20
5 Last Good Part - wash 3.2 105
6 ast Good Part-Travel to 3.5 20robot
Last tood Part - roDot
load to tray @ end of line 3.6 5
8 Last Good Part - Tray 5.2 100index to end 5.2 j 100
TOTAL (min): ZV 0
Cum Man Auto Walk
Major Changeover - First Good Part Timing(first good part of new batch)
1 First Good Part starts after 3.7load line (ref. Op. Work 1 _11
2 First Good Part-Travel 10.7 420through wash to welder .- Ml
-irst Gooa Part - Wait on
Weld C/O Completion 20.6 596
Net Major Changeover Time = 20 m1n
4 ]FIrst Good Part - Weld to 23.8 190Load on tray at end of lineI
TOTAL (min): Z3.U
Cum
U. X ZU.1 U.u
Man Auto Walk
Note: this chart is used in conjunction with the operator work combination sheet to determine appropriate areas of focus for kaizen activities.
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3
The weld cell changeover standardization was also carried to further detail by specifying
the step-by-step procedure in a clear format (for use in operator training). A sample from
this procedure is exhibited in Figure 3-6. This procedure was defined by the collective
subject matter experts on the kaizen team. Also, the times shown on the standard work
combination were arbitrarily chosen as the maximum time for the "subject-matter-
experts" who performed the changeover as part of the kaizen team. By taking the
maximum time from an expert on the line, the intent was to have a reasonable standard
for the changeover time which could be expected of all operators with proper training.
Figure 3-6 Sample Changeover Procedure
Loc'n I Step Explanation
Purging the De-Stacker
A&W I . Place weld station in the Button is located on the remote operator's
manual position panel.
2. Start the incoming washer Lane I (A-Side) can be started from the
conveyor for the appropriate main control panel or the remote panel
lane. located at the beginning of the (A-Side)
washer line.
Lane 2 (B-Side) can only be started from
the main control panel.
3. Press the purge button on the Note:
de-stacker control panel. Cross conveyor and washer conveyor must
be running.
-Remove 2 rmgs/bubs trom conveyor Note:
aftner they are purged frm The as Remove the hubs from conveyor Al or BI
conveyor. if changing to automatic gears.
Restarting the De-stacker
B,C & D 1. Place I piece ot the correct Note:
hub/ring onto the cross Load correct rings into the appropriate silo
conveyor when running manual gears. When running
automatic gears load the correct hub onto
conveyor Al or B1.
2. Press master start button, fault All buttons are located on the remote
reset, and then cycle start operator's panel.
button to restart the system. Note:
Gear Number Ring Number
052, 1302 21001313
1191, 0332,1192 2100131
0334, 1201, 0336
3. Retrieve and load the Note:
appropriate gears onto the Retrieve automatic gears from the Hard
incoming conveyor. Grind Kanban.
Retrieve manual gears from the Green
Gears Kanban.
Channgg over the Welder A&B Side
E urn ott the air. Te air valve is located below the operator's
remote control panel.
3.4.2. Convert Internal Setup to External Setup
Figure 3-7 provides before/after pictures of a changeover improvement for a tool stand.
This stand was used to store and stage grinder tooling for the changeover. The specific
issues are enumerated in illustration. The wheels and chucks had to be picked/placed
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to/from this tool stand during the changeover with the use of a hoist. The old cabinet
required lengthy and ergonomically poor handling while the new stand provided a
simple, proper placement of the tooling which speeded changeover time and facilitated
more ergonomic handling.
Figure 3-7 Example Before/After Tool Stand Improvement
Changeover Tooling Stand CHANGMERCONTINUOUSIMPROVEMENT
BEFORE
* Grinding wheels stored incorrectly
- Chucks stored in wrong orientation
(for installation/transfer) near floor
level Wheel Storage
(incorrectly,
resting on edge)
Chucks Storage
(near floor level)
AFTER
- Grinding wheels stored
appropriately
" Chucks stored at waist level
in installation orientation
- Stand rotates with manual
tools on one side, auto tools
on the other
In some cases, the initial kaizen activity did not provide resolution to all external setup
issues. As illustrated in Figure 3-8, the external setup was reduced considerably (for this
example and in general) in terms of both time and percentage, but external setup
remained as a component of overall setup time. This example was due to an issue with
loading the next part type onto the conveyor during the changeover. The part loading did
not require the machine to be shutdown for any safety or quality reasons, rather the issue
was simply one of conveyor adjustments required before a different part type could be
loaded. However, this issue was solved after the 1-week kaizen workshop when a
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tradesman modified the conveyor to accommodate both part types without adjustment.
This part loading was an issue on another grinder which was a focus for a kaizen
workshop and a different alternative was devised to eliminate the problem there, as well.
Figure 3-8 Before/After Internal versus External Setup
BEFORE AFTER
External
External 11% (5min)
24%(18min)
Internal Internal
76% (57min) 89% (41min)
In general, the setup time reduction actitivities in gear machining did not reveal the
extreme external setup (50-70% of overall setup) that is often referenced in literature.
This fact is a credit to the gear production teams which had already performed some
setup time improvements in previous years.
3.4.3. Eliminate the Adjustment Process
The videotape was again very useful in identifying wasteful internal setup adjustment.
The improvement examples ranged from the design and construction of simple setup
blocks (to facilitate quicker, single setup instead of trial and error) to tooling fixes which
totally eliminated adjustment. For example, in one case a "pusher" block required 4
different positional adjustments depending on part type. Small steel setup spacers were
then fabricated to enable the operator to adjust the "block" until it was against the spacer.
With the old method the operator would follow a trial and error method that included
manually "jogging" the pusher through its cycle to verify/readjust the block. These
adjustment reductions are primarily responsible for the reduction in adjustment time
noted in Figure 3-9. However, since the adjustment is difficult to precisely measure,
41
these adjustment reductions were, in part, responsible for the reduced "change tooling"
time from 27 to 19 minutes.
The hurdle that was not overcome during these kaizen activities was the elimination of
extensive internal adjustment or verification involved in "jogging" the grinding wheels
and gear loader arms through their cycle at each changeover. This lengthy internal
adjustment is indicated in Figure 3-9 (titled "'jog' machine for verification"), as it is the
4th largest step remaining. The primary issue in eliminating this adjustment was the
operators' and engineers' reluctance to accept the risk of not performing this step. While
it rarely required any actual adjustment, and, therefore, served as only a verification step,
they still refused to eliminate it. This issue represents future opportunities for further
reduction, though.
Figure 3-9 Before/After Changeover Time Steps/Categories Pareto
BEFORE Kaizen: Changeover Breakdown AFTER Kaizen: Changeover Breakdown
S
Total Setup Time: 25 46 mn25 24 (31%) 75 min (38% improvement)-
20 20 --- 19 (40%)
15
(10%) 8(10%) 1714%)
S53 (11%) 3 (61%)
Change i Tune4n for size "Jog" machine for "Jog" machine for Adjustment a Change tooling Tune-in forsize "Jog" cine for "Jog machine for, A4ustrnei of
veiiato ce" tosaccess verification , tools
3.4.4. Abolish the Setup Step Itself
Rather than completely eliminating the setup, altogether, as Monden intends, the primary
emphasis during the kaizen activities was to develop cheap and simple means to
eliminate individual portions of the setup (a more realistic goal in our situation). The
videotape combined with kaizen team brainstorming were used to design ways to
eliminate or significantly reduce the steps of setup.
The hob tooling improvement cited in Figure 3-10 was intended to reduce changeover
time and decrease variation in changeover times by eliminating complete screw removal.
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By averting complete screw removal, the screw had to be turned less and didn't need to
be "started" upon re-assembly. "Starting" a screw is a time-consuming process and
handling the screws is unpredictable as they were sometimes dropped into the machine.
A dropped/lost screw might include a subsequent 10-minute search for replacement
screws.
Figure 3-10 Example Before/After Hob Tooling Improvement
Skive Tool Slots CHANGEOtCONTNUOUS IMPROVEMENT
BEFORE
Skive tool change requires
complete removal of two screws
Standard slots require
screw removal
AFTER
* Key-slot added
- Screws only need to be
loosened for skive change
Key-slot for screw-
head clearance
Figure 3-11 provides an example in that screws were totally eliminated by replacing them
with a knob-handle. This improvement eliminated the use of a wrench and significantly
reduced removal/installation time. Also, this improvement was cheaply copied across 30
different tools or 10 different machines and, thereby, displays the real leverage of
continuous improvement in that ideas can be quickly copied across similar equipment.
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Figure 3-11 Example Before/After Shave Tool Improvement
3.5. Future Recommendations
Many of these changeover improvements were significant and were accomplished only
by the outstanding support and ideas of operators, tradesmen, engineers, and leaders.
Many of these individuals were excited about the improvement efforts and the ability to
implement their ideas and improve their operations. This enthusiasm, though, must be
continually fed by extensive support; a seemingly simple, but actually complex issue.
This issue is addressed further in chapter 5.1, Continuous Improvement Insights, but
simply stated, future support must be dedicated to continuous improvement activities in
order to timely implement the best suggestions.
Also, while the improvements in changeover times were significant during the kaizen, the
real changeover time improvements did not result (i.e. after kaizen completion no
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Sampi Part Nest
BEFORE
"Nest changeover requires
wrench.
" Screw was blind to operator.
Screw head on back
(blind) side of nlest
AFTER
" No wrench required for nest
changeover.
" Knob Is easily accessible on
front side.
Knob on operator
(front) side of nest
- -jzU~ - --MUj~~rL&Uj
significant changeover time improvements were noted). The shortfall seems to be due to
a lack of focus on standardization. Through use of the template defined for the weld cell,
the organization needs to continue the standardization effort followed by changeover
improvements. In this way, the setup time reduction activities can follow the more
scientific approach illustrated through the successful examples of process improvement.
The standardization effort must include a significant emphasis to actively involve and
"sell" the operators in order to gain their support; this issue is probably the most complex
and one which has no easy answers. However, one critical factor seems to be in helping
the operators to first understand the problem and then allowing them to realize
standardization as the answer. Heifetz and Laurie (1998) provide a quote from Jan
Carlzon, the "legendary CEO of Scandinavian Airlines System," as he notes: "You won't
be successful if people aren't carrying the recognition of the problem and the solution
within themselves." Allowing the operators to frame the challenge for themselves is
critical in gaining their ownership for the problem and desire to fix it. While many
operators understand the significant variation in changeovers and resulting problems,
many operators don't recognize it as an issue. One way to actually achieve this
recognition with all operators would be to establish a cross-crew team of operators to
record and analyze the changeover methods, durations, and results on a given line in gear
machining. Rather than having the team focus on improvements, they could focus on
recording and observing the resulting variation then report this back to their teams. Then,
once the teams recognize the problem, the leaders and teams should collectively decide
how to resolve the issues.
Another significant step in achieving standardization is in building relationships and trust
between the leadership and operators. Ancona (2000) maintains "building relationships"
as a 2 step in the "change manual" as leaders must forge strong relationships with those
around them in order to successfully implement change. Also, if interactions between
operators and leaders are viewed as simply a form of daily negotiations in an ongoing
relationship, the relationship is a key foundation and resource for an effective negotiation
(Greenhalgh, 2000). Leaders must build strong relationships, especially with operators
who "stand-out" as implicit leaders within their teams, in order to enact support for
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difficult issues such as standardization. These relationships are built though actions such
as setting a personal example (though visible, memorable symbols), speaking honestly,
and even by exhibiting a willingness to accept risk. For example, as the author observed
at Saturn, simple actions by plant-level leaders can serve as visible symbols and were
significant to improve trust. Actions include walking the plant floor to informally
socialize with operators or discuss problems and thanking people for their contributions
toward recent "wins." As observed during kaizen activities, comments from leadership
and their observable enthusiasm for the kaizen process were significant in increasing
commitment from the kaizen team members. Also, leaders who would "tell it like it is"
were respected for their honesty and those who demonstrated a willingness to accept
personal risk by standing firm in the face of adversity were upheld by operators.
In summary, leaders should facilitate recognition and resolution of changeover
standardization problems by the production teams and use precious encouragement for
operators and lower-level leaders in order to build commitment and trust. These efforts
will strengthen the standardization (or any) initiative as it will become less-contested if
operators are leading the initiative and trusted leaders aren't viewed as using the initiative
as a form of hardship.
4. Material and Information Flow Improvements
4.1. Goals
Material and information flow improvements in gear production were primarily intended
to provide a system which would yield immediate benefits to the organization in support
of the primary functional requirements, mentioned previously, and restated as follows.
Deliver products, every shift, according to the customer's needs with the following:
" Right quantity.
* Right mix.
" Right quality.
Failure to meet these first requirements essentially resulted in downtime to the customer.
This downtime was often attributed directly to equipment failures; however, the root
46
cause was often in poor scheduling decisions which increased exposure through low
inventory levels. Therefore, the impact on downtime wasn't direct, but was important,
nonetheless, in improving the performance of the gear area.
The 3 other primary objectives are listed below:
" Show problems immediately (when & where).
* Robust to variation.
" Improvable and forces improvement.
In order to show problems immediately the system had to first differentiate "normal"
from "abnormal" by providing some form of standardization in material and information
flow. As mentioned in the description of the original material replenishment system,
there was a definitive lack of standardization in scheduling decisions and triggers for
changeovers. This haphazard approach yielded large fluctuations in inventory levels, but
unclear signals about problem areas. In addition, the original approach to scheduling was
unclear and therefore, inherently difficult to monitor. A simple system was desired in
order to keep it manageable (through the immediate spotlighting of issues) and useful for
the production teams and leaders to make scheduling decisions.
The system also had to be robust to variation as equipment downtime was unpredictable
and with a multiple-stage manufacturing system, the impact of an upstream process'
downtime on its downstream processes (or customers) had to be reduced. This
robustness would result in improved efficiency (with less starvation/blockage time) and
would also provide flexibility to the module in order to allow preventative maintenance
activities to be performed during production hours. With an increasing focus on costs
and controlling overtime expenses, the facility was stressed for ways to perform
preventative maintenance activities during regular, production hours. Therefore, this
ability of the system to provide some means of evaluating the decision to idle equipment
for preventative maintenance was important.
Finally, an improveable system and a system which forced improvement was the ideal
goal. This "forced improvement" is one of the critical aspects of TPS as the systems on
the manufacturing floor create a drive for continuous improvement. As was stated by
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Dr. Chris Couch (2000) of Toyota Motor Corp. Japan, the psychological pressure on
people in the plant, which is the "dark side of lean," is also a major competitive
advantage as it creates an emphasis to get the job done.
These 6 functional requirements were intended to drive the project toward a stable system
design. Also, the improvements were intended both to be implemented across the
manufacturing system within the limited timeframe and to actively involve the gear
production teams and leaders to insure the system's long-term success.
4.2. Literature Review
In a pull system, releases into the production system are triggered by downstream (the
next customer's) demand, while in a push system, releases are scheduled into the system.
Hopp and Spearman (1996) provide the fundamental distinction between push and pull
systems as follows. "Push systems control throughput and observe WIP. Pull systems
control WIP and observe throughput" (p. 325). Cochran (1999) maintains that the
distinction is primarily in the direction of information flow. With pull systems the
information flows in the opposite direction of the material flow to pull material from
upstream processes, but with push systems, information flows in the same direction as
material to pass production requirements to the next operation (according to a plan).
Figure 4-2 shows the material and information flow for a sequential pull system (ref.
Figure 4-1 for legend) as applied to Saturn gear machining, while Figure 4-3 provides the
standard "push" system illustration. A CONWIP (CONstant Work-In-Process) "pull" (as
defined by Hopp and Spearman [1996]) system is shown in Figure 4-4. It appears similar
to the "push" system but includes one critical linkage which synchronizes production
releases at the end of the manufacturing system with the scheduling releases at the
beginning of the system in order to control the overall inventory (WIP) level. CONWIP
will subsequently be defined in further detail. Figure 4-5 illustrates the implemented
system in Saturn gear machining for comparison only. Its primary distinctions are its use
of the count sheet as the principal mode of information flow across all areas of the
manufacturing system.
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Figure 4-1 Legend for Material and Information Flow Diagrams
Buffer (with varying ENO Material Flow77 levels of each part
type) '''-y' Information
Flow
SWIP (with standard
"card" quantity of
each part type)
Figure 4-2 Sequential-Pull System (Kanban with SWIP Application)
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Green Weld Heat Hard
Gears Cell - Treat Grind ustome
II
Figure 4-3 Push-System using Standard (Forecast-Based) Schedule
Note: the schedule would also consider the customer's demand; however, this information linkage is not shown for clarity.
Figure 4-4 CONWIP-type "Pull" System
Note: the schedule would also consider the customer's demand; however, this information linkage is not shown for clarity.
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Figure 4-5 Implemented System in Saturn Gear Machining
- ----- -- - -- at' F ow ---- ---- -- - ~- -- - -Mat'l Flow /
- ----------- She
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Green Weld a Heat 
_ HardinoCwstrleyGearsj Cell Treat v p Grind =wo u m
Note: the customer demand data is also directly linked to the material flow sheet, but is not shown for clarity.
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Cochran summarizes the goal of a pull system as "...to eliminate speculative production
and to provide the ability to produce to actual demand" (p. 4). Hopp and Spearman
(1996) also enumerate reasons why a CONWIP-type pull system is better than push
systems through categories including observability, efficiency, variability, and
robustness. A "pull" systems control of WIP is a key advantage. WIP is directly
observable and therefore simpler to control, which borrows from a general principle of
control theory to control the robust parameter and observe the sensitive parameter (Hopp
and Spearman, 1996).
As pull systems offer a simpler form of control, they are better-suited for a system such
as gear machining and different forms of "pull" are subsequently reviewed. However, the
definition a of "push" or "pull" system is dependent on the system boundary. For
example, CONWIP's definition as a "pull" system is inaccurate since production
information flows in the same direction as material. The main point that the author
wishes to convey is that the material replenishment systems reviewed herein are ones
considered most applicable for the gear manufacturing system.
4.2.1. Sequential Pull System
Kanban is one of the most widely adopted tools of the Toyota Production System. In
fact, it is commonly mistaken as the basis of the Toyota Production System, as Shingo
(1989) illustrates.
"Some people imagine that Toyota has put on a smart new set of clothes, the kanban
system, so they go out and purchase the same outfit and try it on. They quickly
discover that they are much too fat to wear it" (p. 67).
Monden (1993) defines Kanban as "a medium of information for dispatching the right
quantity of the right item at the right time" (p. 279). The word kanban is Japanese for
card (Hopp and Spearman, 1996). In the Toyota Production System, cards are used to
synchronize the flow of material and hold inventory to a minimum both within the plant,
and in many cases, with external suppliers. While the true definition of kanban is simply
"card," the author will use the term more liberally, as Hopp and Spearman (1996) do, to
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apply to a sequential pull system including standard work-in-process (SWIP) between
processes or individual stations, in some cases. Cochran (1999) defines this kanban with
SWIP approach as a type "A" pull system.
Kanban with SWIP primarily operates as follows: a part is removed from a final
inventory point, its production card is sent to the final station which produces this part to
signal production of a replacement, then the material removal by this final station (to
replace this part) triggers upstream stations to replenish the parts just used, and so on. In
this basic form of kanban, signals are stepped from the final station upstream through the
process, station by station.
Kanban is a simple, visual information system which makes it easy to control and
provides autonomy to the production floor. With only instructions at the final operation,
the kanban system facilitates information flow backward through the processing sequence
through a series of chain reactions (Shingo, 1989). However, this simplicity also poses
constraints. Typical kanban with SWIP requires a standard inventory quantity for each
individual part type at every major customer-supplier link of a manufacturing process or
in its basic form, between each station. This inventory allocation is based on individual
part demand in comparison to system cycle times and lead times. However, significant
changes in part demand can result in associated changes in SWIP levels at all stages of
the manufacturing system (if cycle times are constrained or unchanged). However,
leveling is a critical basis for sequential pull as it flattens the spikes in demand levels to
combat this effect. Also, Toyota would rarely change the actual number of kanban (the
SWIP levels) and instead would adjust cycle times to account for the demand changes
(Monden, 1993). This cycle time adjustment essentially increases the frequency of
kanban replenishment in order to meet the increased demand or vice versa.
Although, based on total overall demand variability and leveling abilities, kanban is
sometimes constrained to situations with relatively low product variety and stable
individual part demand. This issue is primarily a question of the allowable inventory
levels, though, as any system can operate using sequential pull if inventory levels are
high enough to cover the leveling limitations (or extreme demand volatility). Shingo
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(1989) stipulates that kanban systems "are not applicable in one-of-a-kind production" (p.
189) and yield the most benefit in dealing with "parts using common processes" (p. 189).
In addition, both Shingo and Monden (1993) emphasize that kanban should not be simply
applied without first considering and improving the production system. Monden includes
"designing a layout of machines, standardizing operations, and shortening the setup time"
(p. 280) as examples of preparatory production system improvements. In short, kanban is
simply a tool that requires a certain level of discipline and manufacturing process
stability to implement; however, any improveable system (ref. objectives) in
manufacturing would require the same.
Sequential pull's ability to meet the primary system objectives is evident as the right
quantity, mix, and quality to the customer are achieved through a daisy-chain of
information flow. It immediately illustrates problems through its visual system, is robust
to variation by decoupling processes through customer-supplier SWIP, and is easily
improveable as it is relatively simple to implement and thereby, improve. However, as
will be discussed further, its only limitation was the floor-space requirements necessary
to achieve it, given the large run sizes in gear machining.
4.2.2. CONWIP
Hopp and Spearman (1996) define CONWIP (CONstant Work in Process) as a pull
production system that focuses on maintaining a predefined WIP level. This is
accomplished through the use of cards/signals which, after a part is completed at the end
of the line, are sent to the beginning of the line to allow the release of new jobs into
production (ref. Figure 4-4). CONWIP is not a true "pull" system in that information
flow is pushed through most of the system in the same direction as production. CONWIP
proponents would argue that this is largely dependent on one's view of the system.
However, CONWIP does not convey production information from the end back to the
beginning of the manufacturing system; rather, it simply signals from beginning to end of
the manufacturing system to initiate production, which controls the WIP level.
Although, putting aside the push/pull definition, this simplicity of CONWIP is a potential
advantage as kanban requires setting more parameters and tracking additional cards than
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CONWIP. For example, a typical kanban system would place a given card count on
individual loops between customer and producer, while a CONWIP system would have
only a single card count (i.e. a WIP card) for the entire system. In addition, kanban cards
are part number specific while CONWIP is line specific as it only controls WIP quantity
and production/part type information is separate (Hopp and Spearman, 1996). The cards
in a CONWIP system are sent to the front of the line and matched with a production
sequence; therefore, the card actually authorizes the production of several different part
types each time it is sent to the front of the line.
An important distinction between CONWIP and kanban with SWIP is that the kanban
with SWIP is predicated on a standard card circulation quantity for each part type
between each station, while these repeated multiple-part-type buffers are not necessitated
with CONWIP (ref. and compare Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-4). This benefit is the primary
one for CONWIP as it allows less overall-system inventory than sequential pull.
However, this reduced inventory does not come without a price. CONWIP generally
requires maintenance of a strict first-in first-out (FIFO) inventory control system between
stations but does not provide an explicit means to address fallout (scrap or rework) in the
process. Therefore, some secondary means of addressing fallout must be included. For
example, if part "A" is started in green gears but is damaged and scrapped in the weld cell
then this fallout reduces the overall WIP level and eliminates that production job of part
"A." Therefore, a method to capture the fallout and reinitiate its production, must be
included. This more complete view of CONWIP is summarized in Figure 4-6 as fallout
feedback loops (solid lines) are included to send this information back to the start of the
line and to the schedule in order to reinitiate production. This delayed fallout
replenishment must also be accounted for with a higher safety stock in the finished gears
buffer (after hard grind). Another disadvantage to CONWIP is that is does not present
clear approaches to deal with setup times and highly complex part flow paths. Kanban's
simplicity is a definitive advantage, in this regard, as only standardization of card
circulation counts at each customer-supplier link in the chain is required, rather than
standardizing a WIP card count for the entire system.
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Figure 4-6 CONWIP including Fallout Information Feedback Loops
Note: fallout information feedback loops are shown as solid lines.
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Finally, CONWIP can be made to meet the primary system objectives of right quantity,
mix, and quality to the customer by facilitating fallout feedback and sufficient finished
gear safety stocks. However, its ability to immediately illustrate problems is limited by
its relative complexity (and need for a computer interface for such as large system as gear
machining). It is not extremely robust to variation because processes are coupled due to
low overall inventory levels, and it is not as easily improved as sequential pull since
improvement goals and changes must account for the complete system's capabilities,
rather than those of simply one process. Given these disadvantages, CONWIP's ability to
facilitate lower system inventory levels and associated floor-space requirements (for the
large current run sizes) made it a candidate for an implementable system within the
overall project timeline. In addition, despite its disadvantages, it would seemingly
improve the current system.
4.2.3. Decomposition Method of Scheduling
Gershwin (1999) provides a scheduling policy using decomposition methods which is
based on the definition of a set of control points and flow limits, through finite buffers
and hedging times (lead times). His approach handles complexity such as multiple part
types with similar paths, finite capacity, and unreliable machines but provides a simple
policy. The approach is probably best depicted through an illustration such as Figure 4-5
(the implemented system), but rather than using a material flow sheet, the information on
inventory levels and status on each line would be tabulated and analyzed by a computer
system to generate production instructions for each area.
The policy operates as follows. The manufacturing system is analyzed and some
machines or resources are defined as control points while other machines use a simple
scheduling policy such as FIFO. A hedging time is estimated for each part type at each
control point. The hedging time is a conservative estimate of the lead-time, which
includes considerations of machine downtime, queuing, and cost of late deliveries and
inventory. Therefore, this lead time exceeds the minimal remaining process time. Finite
buffer sizes can also be defined for individual part types at each stage of the
manufacturing system, and parts are ranked in order of importance at each control point.
57
Once the control points, lead times, and rank ordering parameters are defined, the
scheduling system executes in the following manner. At each control point, a resource is
defined as available if it is unoccupied. A part at a control point is defined as available if
it is ready for this operation and if the downstream buffer of this part type is not full. A
part at a control point is defined as ready if it is available and "the current time + the
hedging time > the due date" (Gershwin, 1999). Therefore, at each control point, the
policy is enacted when a resource becomes available. It then finds the highest ranking
part type that is ready and begins operation of this part type. If no parts are ready, then
the policy is re-enacted the next time a part arrives.
In summary, Gershwin's approach maintains upper limits on inventory through maximum
buffer sizes and handles complexity by providing the capability to re-sequence parts at
multiple different control points throughout the manufacturing system. This policy
involves relatively clear rules, although as the policy is expanded through future research
to encompass setup times, the rule complexity will increase significantly. The policy was
originally designed for use in semiconductor fabrication where automated production
scheduling is handled by computer. However, a computerized approach was not sought
in this application in gear manufacturing.
This policy could meet the primary system objectives of right quantity, mix, and quality
to the customer through a computerized system that insured part delivery through lead
time estimates. In addition, through usage of computer screens and production
monitoring information it could immediately illustrate problems. However, it is not
extremely robust to variation as it does not handle setup time issues, yet, and doesn't
explicitly account for fallout. In addition, its relative complexity and computerized
architecture could make it difficult to improve. However, it provides a useful reference
for an approach which utilizes control points to add robustness to variation in order to
insure that the first three primary objectives are met.
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4.3. Methodology
4.3.1. General Approach
Floor-space and part dunnage limitations combined with a limited implementation
timeframe were the major constraints in choosing an approach. Due to the system's
complex flow-paths, large run sizes, and extreme process time variation, a combined
approach using CONWIP and Gershwin's (1999) policy seemed to be most applicable.
Since significant reductions in run sizes were not realized in the short-term, the kanban
with SWIP approach would have necessitated considerable inventory increases (and
associated floor-space and dunnage increases) due to requirements for SWIP at each
customer-supplier link in the manufacturing system (ref. Section 4.6, Recommendations
for the compete analysis). However, a simple CONWIP application was not possible
because the extremely varied part flow-paths would not allow specification of standard
WIP levels for a given line within the system. Rather the approach, from the author's
viewpoint, had to be focused on standardizing WIP levels for individual part types but
with a system-wide view. Notably, this was, in part, how the system was operated with
the old material flow sheet but without success.
The focus on WIP level standardization was intended to drive run size standardization
and reduce variation in the system. This variation was causing failures to meet the
customer's needs (for the right quantity, mix, and quality). In addition, the lack of
standardization in the previous scheduling policy limited the approach's improveability,
robustness to variation, and did not provide immediate focus on problems. Through WIP
level standardization, the author intended to more closely meet these primary functional
requirements of the manufacturing system.
With a focus on maintaining WIP levels, the approach taken was similar to CONWIP.
As Hopp and Spearman (1996) note:
"The simplest way we can think of to establish a WIP cap is just do it! For a given
production line, establish a limit on the WIP in the line and simply do not allow
releases into the line whenever the WIP is at or above the limit."
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The essence of this approach was to create a WIP cap on each part type. However, rather
than setting the cap based on a fixed quantity of parts, as CONWIP would typically
necessitate, the WIP cap for each part was set in days (based on the amount of days of
demand represented in WIP). In this way, the WIP limits were directly tied to the
customer demand so that as customer demand changes, the WIP level evaluation changes
respectively. This effectively ties the approach to the first three primary objectives (right
quantity, mix, and quality). Also, the approach sought to evaluate this cap at multiple
points in the gear manufacturing system (similar to the Gershwin approach) in order to
improve the robustness to variation (a primary objective, as well).
4.3.2. Major Processes as Control Points
The core of the Gershwin approach is its use of "control points." The control points
permit a scheduling decision based on a comparison of the total remaining process time
versus the needed delivery time to the customer. Gershwin's approach also calls for a
simple FIFO policy at non-critical resources. For this system, the author chose to define
each process stage or line as a control point, at which inventory levels would be evaluated
and material would be re-sequenced, as necessary. For example, in a simple FIFO
system parts of type "A" might arrive first for weld processing then parts of type "B."
These parts would then be processed on a FIFO basis by weld processing as they would
simply run parts as they arrived, first the "A" parts, then the "B" parts. However, in a
more complex and highly variable system, the "B" parts might arrive first, but then,
before the changeover to an "A" or "B" part, the "A" parts might also arrive. In this case,
the "A" parts might actually need to be run first, but this would contradict the FIFO
policy. The definition of control points at each stage of the process allows the flexibility
to re-sequence parts (run the "A" before the "B" parts or vice versa, if necessary)
according to the downstream customer demand.
This control point choice was largely predicated on the extreme complexity in trying to
maintain a seemingly simpler FIFO system and the variability (equipment failures or
other) in this system. Maintaining FIFO would have been difficult due to the number of
different part types processed by each line, the limited floor-space for inventory staging,
and the general lack of material flow discipline with production operators. The variety of
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part types was one of the most significant issues because in order to manage FIFO, a
checks and balances system would need to be put in place with leadership review to
check for errors. However, the leaders did not have the time or patience to review thirty
different gear types in multiple areas when other downtime or administrative issues were
"pressing." Based upon an in-depth understanding of the system, the author viewed
material stagnation and scheduling mix-ups as inevitable outcomes of attempting a FIFO
policy.
Variability in the system was the other primary reason that a control point-like approach
was viewed as optimal. Random equipment failures often led to part shortages and
necessitated material re-shuffling on an almost daily basis; the control points allowed this
re-shuffling at each major process but facilitated much more informed decision making
(i.e. a more objective re-shuffling).
4.3.3. Total Downstream WIP Consideration
With each major process as a control point, the downstream inventory levels from each
control point to the final customer had to be reported in units of customer demand (e.g.
days or hours). These statistics were necessary to allow each process the ability to make
the best decision about which part was most needed by the subsequent process and to
control WIP. The original material flow sheet included the inventory counts at each
process and each operation but, in general, did not provide summary statistics for each
process and each part type.
A material flow sheet approach to reporting these numbers was elected because of its
simplicity of implementation (i.e. only required revisions to the previous system).
Therefore, a new material flow sheet was created which added these downstream WIP
numbers, in demand-based units. This revision process (of the material flow sheet) was
completed with the support of the production operators and in doing so, also streamlined
the sheet by eliminating unnecessary information and optimizing the overall format.
The new material flow sheet, though, did contain some downstream inventory statistics
that the original sheet previously included. For example, the total downstream inventory
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(for the entire machining system) was already present on the old sheet. As mentioned
previously, this total ("days in the system") was used by the green gears area to decide
which parts to run or when to changeover. In addition, for the areas directly preceding
the customer, an "hours from grind" number was already on the sheet to indicate which
parts were most needed by the customer. However, while the first process, green gears,
and the last process, hard grind or weld cell (depending on part type), had a clear
indication of the total downstream inventory, all stages in between did not.
Figure 4-7 better illustrates how scheduling decisions were made before and after the
changes. This diagram shows the area specific snapshot of inventory levels considered in
scheduling with the old material flow sheet and the new. For example, with the old
method the weld cell would typically review the part availability (i.e. the inventory in the
buffer from green gears or pre-weld cell) and then decide which part to run (based on
which one had a reasonable stock of parts available). However, with the new method, the
weld cell considers the total downstream inventory (i.e. inventory from the weld cell
buffer to the customer) in order to decide which part to run. The new process is
characterized by consistency as all areas are evaluating the total inventory downstream
from their process in making production decisions.
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Figure 4-7 Inventory Considered in Scheduling Before/After
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The new approach, while driving consistency across all areas to evaluate total
downstream inventory levels, also provides each area with the best indication of which
parts are most needed by its subsequent customer. For example, as long as these numbers
are provided in consistent terms of time (i.e. time of demand), then, when comparing
parts with similar remaining process times, the part with the lowest time of demand
coverage is the one most needed by the subsequent process. Gershwin's (1999) policy
similarly does this through a comparison of the actual time plus hedging time versus
needed delivery time.
For example, if an operator is running a grinder, he/she can review the inventory levels
for the 2 parts that run on this grinder. If parts "A" and "B" have the same remaining
process (throughput) time of 10-hours and part "A" has a downstream inventory level of
12-hours while "B" has 21-hours, then part "A" is most needed by the subsequent
process. If part "A" is not run within 2 hours, then the customer could be shutdown, but
part "B" does not necessarily need to be run within the next 11 hours to prevent shutting-
down the customer. It is important to remember that the remaining process time is the
total throughput time from the given grinder/line (control point) to the end of the gear
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manufacturing system (i.e. to the customer). This simple approach becomes slightly
more complex as different remaining process times are considered or if parts have similar
downstream inventory levels. This will be discussed in more detail in a later section.
4.3.4. Minimum and Maximum WIP Limits
Having exhibited the methodology to consider downstream inventory levels, the next step
in using this information to make production decisions is to define an acceptable range on
these WIP levels. This WIP range standardization primarily facilitates quick problem
identification, but also insures that the right quantity, mix, and quality of parts are
delivered according to customer demand.
In setting the minimum acceptable WIP level, the primary consideration is the remaining
process (throughput) time. For example, the green gears teams, which load raw material
into the system (as the first process), must monitor the total system inventory. They must
insure that the system inventory doesn't get low enough that insufficient inventory
coverage exists to cover the total process time for gears from start to finish. In simple
terms, if it takes 3 days for gears to be processed from start to finish then letting
inventories of total gears drop to 2 days could potentially result in 1 day of downtime to
the customer. Similarly, the other processes must take a similar approach in evaluating
the remaining throughput time versus the downstream inventory levels.
The remaining throughput time estimate is highly contingent upon the assumed lot size
(i.e. the number of parts to be transferred between processes) as shown in Figure 4-8. As
this figure shows, the larger lot size leads to a longer throughput time. This time is
mostly waste of lot delay as parts are simply waiting on processing of others from a run
before conveyance to the next step (e.g. the actual process time is approximately 10 hours
for one gear). Also, these cumulative process times include a "safety factor" to account
for queuing time between processes. This factor was chosen as 25% of the total
throughput time as a reasonable estimate of the typical accumulated queuing time. It is
important to note that this queuing time is different from the lot delay and rather
represents the process delay before the batch of parts are even started in an area. For
example, as soon as 4 carts of a given part type are complete in green gears, the weld cell
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does not immediately begin processing of them (as the weld cell is completing its
previous run or preparing to run another part first).
Figure 4-8 Throughput Time versus Lot Size
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M Green Gears
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For design of this system, a minimum lot transfer size of 4-carts was assumed for all part
types. This size was chosen because it was a typical minimum, although lot sizes varied
considerably. Also, this choice coupled with the queuing time safety factor were then
calibrated by a reality check for each process to understand if the throughput time
assumptions were reasonable.
The decision of this minimum lot transfer size and the respective minimum WIP level
would seemingly want to be biased low to reduce inventory levels or high to provide the
greatest safety factor for downtime. However, the ultimate choice was based on having a
reasonable safety factor for downtime, which was of primary importance to the
organization. This safety factor was not set according to the estimated standard
deviation, though, due to limited aggregate downtime data; instead, a comparison against
past downtime and associated minimum inventory levels was used.
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The maximum allowable WIP level was set based upon maximum allowable run sizes for
a given part type and the run length (total process time for a run). This method made the
maximum allowable WIP calculations fairly simple as they were based on the minimum
WIP level, plus the maximum allowable run size, less the run length. For example, if a
part had a minimum level of 3.5 days, a chosen maximum run size of 4.5 days, and a run
length of 1.0 day (process time to run 4.5-days worth of the part), then the maximum
would be 3.5+4.5-1.0=7.0 days. This example is illustrated graphically in Figure 4-9.
The variable of choice for the maximum WIP level was then the assumed maximum run
size. These run sizes were controlled or kept relatively low in order to drive WIP
standardization into the process.
Figure 4-9 Maximum Total WIP Level Estimate Illustration
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Choosing low maximum WIP levels (and low maximum run sizes), in comparison to past
practice, had the potential of forcing more changeovers in the process. The lower run
sizes were not a capacity issue in most cases, rather they were largely a social issue in
gaining acceptance of the scheduling changes from production operators. The end result
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was a much tighter WIP level than past practice, but one which the teams accepted after
some "selling" (see implementation section).
The minimum and maximum WIP levels are referred to as "triggers" in the plant because
they generally trigger/signal a changeover or switching from one part type to another.
Using the method just explained, these minimum and maximum triggers were developed
for each part type at each process to create WIP standardization evaluated at each
process.
4.3.5. Color Signaling
After generating minimum and maximum triggers or WIP limits, the next objective was
to define a clear expectation for what to do when the triggers were reached. The triggers
were added to the new material flow sheet but a simple visual format was needed, also.
This color coding facilitated the objectives of not only quickly spotlighting problems but
also provided more robustness to the scheduling policy (and subsequently to the
manufacturing system). Plain numbers to indicate the inventory level and the limits on
that level would not provide a quick visual aid to understand expectations and indicate
which parts were at or near the WIP limits. Therefore, colors were used to provide this
clear visual indication of the status of individual part downstream inventory levels at each
process. Four different statuses and colored formats were defined as shown in Figure
4-10.
Figure 4-10 Formats for Inventory Level Statistics
.= Changeover first-half of shift
1.0 Changeover second half of shift
Parts in acceptable range
Stop running this part type
Note: 1.0 only shows a sample inventory level number for a given part type.
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The status meanings and color codes were as follows:
" Changeover first-half of shift. Part was at or would reach its minimum trigger within
the first-half of the shift and therefore, required a changeover in the first-half. The
inventory level cell was shaded solid red.
* Changeover second-half of shift. Part would reach its minimum trigger during the
second-half of the shift and therefore, required a changeover in the second-half. The
inventory level cell was shaded solid yellow.
* Part in acceptable range. Part is between the minimum and maximum triggers. The
inventory level cell was shaded with green diagonal lines.
* Stop running this part type. Part is above its minimum trigger and the line either
needs to be changed-over to run another part type or shutdown for preventative
maintenance activities. The cell was shaded with blue cross-hatch.
These status indicators provide a clear indication of which parts are near the inventory
limits but in some cases, only provide a general indication of what the specific machine
should run. Under normal circumstances these triggers can be followed and parts
changeovers occur as the sheet specifies. However, in extenuating circumstances when
equipment failure or quality issues create system imbalances, the sheet only provides a
reference to facilitate decision making by the operators and production leadership team.
For example, if two parts which run on the same grinder are both indicating to
"changeover first-half of shift" then an informed decision needs to be made about which
part to run first. In some cases, the team may decide to run the part with the lower
inventory level (assuming similar remaining process times for the two parts), but in other
cases may choose a different approach.
In this regard, the sheet is a very simple tool which is "dumb" to the multitude of
complexities in the system. The reason for this simplicity is to keep the sheet as a simple
tool, which the production teams could understand and thereby support, and to maintain a
"low-level" system that empowered the production teams and leaders to make decisions
in extenuating circumstances. By keeping the critical decision making in the control of
the people on the production floor, rather than in a computer algorithm, the people retain
ownership for the system and can consider all the relevant factors in making these
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decisions, rather than a just limited set of programmed inputs. Finally, the goal with this
system was to help avoid the extenuating circumstances in the first place such that they
were no longer commonplace in daily production.
4.4. Implementation
The new (implemented) material flow sheet is shown in Figure 4-11 for a typical
production shift. The sheet is printed at the beginning of each shift and color copies are
provided to each team by their production leaders. Inventory counts contained on the
sheet are linked to the same intranet-based database system that the previous count sheet
used. The sheet is a worksheet in a fairly simple Microsoft Excel workbook. Production
leaders print it at the start of each shift, after the material flow point people for each
production team enter the inventory counts (which are still performed manually). The
sheet is printed double-sided with the automatic gears on one side and the manual gears
on the other. Its Excel based format has made it easy to maintain and revise, even after
takeover upon the author's completion of the internship.
The key steps in implementation were informing and receiving "buy-in" from all
production teams (for each process), on each shift. This "buy-in" was critical because of
the Saturn's unique relatively autonomous team structure and to gain support and
commitment to the changes. Meetings with each team were held by the author to review
the intent and format of the new sheet and illustrations similar to those previously
presented herein were used to explain the basis for the sheet. The new sheet was very
well received on the plant floor because operators liked the explicit expectations for
changeovers, including color coding, and because a few key leaders on the teams saw the
sheet's potential for real improvement. As can be seen from this new sheet, not only were
downstream inventory levels and limits specified for each area, but also the overall
format was revised to improve readability. Again, these revisions were made based on
suggestions from the operators. The format is intended to separate each process by bold
lines and clearly distinguish the key statistics, downstream inventory totals, for each area
using double-lines. Figure 4-11 provides callouts which further highlight the downstream
inventory statistics, and Figure 4-12 includes more detailed explanations of the decision
process or actual use of the sheet.
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Figure 4-11 New Material Flow Sheet
Perf/Base P/B P/B B P 
B P P/B P B B P 
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ard Line/Mach 1-1234 5-1239 1-1236 1-1236 1-1235 1-1235 5-1232 
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/ 60 10 / 130 10 /130 10/0 10/60 30/100 30/100
Har U/P
Weld I/P-Comp.
Kanban 360 248 480 434 
191
Hours from Weld
Min / Max Trigger (hrs) 25 / 90 10 / 120 10 / 60 10 / 120 10/60 
10/60 10/120
Hard I/P 0
Turn 1/P-Comp.
Kanban 440/
Hours from Turn, 10 /60 IN /W. Trigger (hrs)
Format/Color Codes: Changeover first-half of shift
1.0 Cangeover second half of shift
Parts in acceptable range
1.0 Stop running this part type
At Assemblyl 216 594 80 114 260 1 450 96 252 382 
288 217 269 59 86 150
Hours Avail. to Asm. i . . 1. .
. .
2 39. 4 .8 . 2 .4 
2.0
Pro ductio n Rate s BA = 195 per day 9.75 per hour 
PA = 554 per day 27.7 per hour Total = 749 per day 
37.45 per hour
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eTotal downstream inventory
from Green Gears-also the
total inventory in the system
for each part type.
Print Date: 01/04/00 6:10 PM Tuesday Report Date/Crew: 12/16/1999 A Crew Days remaining this week: 2.5
* Downstream Inventory
statistic for Heat Treat.
*These numbers are
colored/shaded per the
min/max triggers shown in
the next row.
,Summary line to indicate the
buffer of finished gears
available to the customer
(assembly).
*Used by leaders to quickly
understand which parts are
"hottest"
eColors also added on this
line to show (red-parts with
less than 1-shift of coverage;
yellow-parts with less than
2-shifts coverage)
Note: The sheet shown is for auto gears only, a similar manual sheet is printed 
double-sided with the auto. All numbers are actual inventory counts (number of
gears of a a given part type [columns] in a given area [rows]), unless otherwise specified. 
"I/P" indicates in-process part counts; Kanban is the common term
(used by gears personnel) for the buffers; "PA/BA" indicates performance automatic and base 
automatic style.
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Figure 4-12 Illustrations of Using the New Material Flow Sheet
*Part #2429 is "yellow" for
Green Gears--at 3.3 days of
total downstream Inventory
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3 day minimum trigger.
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the 6.5 day maximum trigger.
" Result: need to run another
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" Part #1551/3236 is In "red"
for Hard Weld--at 17.5 hours
of parts In total downstream
inventory to the customer
and under the 25 hour
minimum trigger.
eAlso, parts are available to
weld from Hard Grind (in its
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'Result: need to run It first in
weld.
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'Part #1591 is "red" for Hard
Grind-at 7.8 hours of parts
to the customer and under
the 10 hour minimum trigger.
'Also, parts are available to
grind from Heat Treat (in its
buffer/"kanban".
Format/Color Codes: Changeover first-half of shift
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1.0 Stop running this part type
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The implementation did spotlight some issues as operators did not support/follow the
inventory limits due to lack of commitment, inaccurate inventory counts caused
confusion, printing a multitude of color copies proved more difficult than expected, and
attention to production counts was still an issue. As can be seen from Figure 4-11, some
parts are below minimum triggers, which should not occur if the sheet were followed
100% or if equipment downtime wasn't an issue. To address the issue of operator
commitment, a workshop was held, after the initial one-month implementation, with
material flow point people, team leaders, and gears' production leaders. This workshop
proved successful as it served to further educate the teams and leaders about the intent of
the new sheet, facilitated communication across teams and crews around issues, and
created a renewed commitment from the teams. The workshop resulted in proposed
changes to "operating norms" for various teams which were then approved at the formal
module "decision-ring" (decision making body).
The inaccurate inventory counts illustrated the need for a check sheet to catch count
errors or typographical errors in entering inventory counts. A simple "error check sheet"
was added to the material flow sheet file (an Excel workbook) which is automatically
generated and easily printed with the automatic and manual material flow sheets. This
check sheet seemed to meet the need of capturing most count errors while staying simple.
The printing of color copies was primarily a logistics issue, but the author mentions it
here only to caution others not to overlook these seemingly simple issues during project
implementation. The color copies actually became a prime currency as the operators
appreciated the easy-to-read format and were frustrated when color copies were
unavailable.
As can be noted from the material flow sheet, it does include the customer demand
information but does not include the takt times (or daily build requirements) for each
individual line. The colors on the sheet did help to highlight the production issues,
though, as a sheet which had considerable red color indicated problem areas. However,
the material flow sheet is only a tool for monitoring inventory and making scheduling
decisions, but does not guarantee production. To this end, the author worked with the
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production leaders to implement a new sheet for reporting daily production counts which
was a revision from the previous one. The changes made were to include the daily
production requirements for every line and tabulate the associated shortage/overage on
the sheet using a similar colored approach. This issue simply illustrates the material flow
sheet's inability to meet the primary system objectives on its own.
The new system and material flow sheet is still in use at the time of publishing this paper
and has been the primary scheduling method since November, 1999. The primary reason
for its acceptance seems to have been the involvement of production teams and leaders
during the development phase accompanied by the author's attempts to quickly respond
to eliminate issues during implementation.
4.5. Results
The results of the implementation of this new count sheet or scheduling system were
difficult to estimate after only a 1%-month implementation at the completion of this
internship. Also, the organization had numerous continuous improvement work
underway, thus attributing causality for bottom-line improvements is difficult. However,
some results can be noted.
4.5.1. Internal Efficiency Improvement
Two of the primary objectives with the material and information flow improvements
were to "show problems immediately" and provide a system that was "robust to
variation." By showing problems immediately and creating a more robust process, this
new scheduling policy should have incurred fewer downstream part shortages, thereby
improving the overall efficiency of the gear machining module. While improvements in
this area are difficult to measure over a limited implementation, the internal downtime
reported for categories that are generally considered "waiting on parts from upstream
processes" is shown in Figure 4-13. A 25% overall reduction in internal downtime
related to lack of parts from preceding processes was observed. This provides some
evidence that different processes are not incurring as much inefficient, starvation time.
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Figure 4-13 Reduction in Internal Downtime for Lack of Parts
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4.5.2. Downtime to the Customer
The previous material flow system did subject the customer (transmission assembly) to
occasional, brief downtime. These occurrences were failures to meet the primary
manufacturing system's objectives (the customer's needs for the right quantity, mix, and
quality) which occurred due to errors in material flow or scheduling. While these errors
might not have directly caused the downtime, in some cases, the errors created a low
inventory situation which, coupled with an equipment failure, caused the customer to be
shutdown. For example, in one situation during the author's internship, the green gears
line did not changeover when necessary. This created a part shortage in the system
which, compounded with downtime in heat treat, eventually shutdown the customer.
In measuring the impact of the new system on downtime, it is important to consider that
the material flow system is not designed to protect against major, catastrophic downtime
occurrences, which the author defines as those over two hours. With these "catastrophic"
occurrences excluded, the downtime to the customer did show some improvement as
shown in Figure 4-14 below. The initial changes began in October with the full, new
material flow sheet implementation by the start of November. The downtime is non-zero,
though, which indicates further improvement opportunities (to be covered subsequently).
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Figure 4-14 Downtime to the Customer excluding "Catastrophic" Occurrences
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4.5.3. WIP Level Standardization
The right quantity, mix, and quality objectives to the customer, transmission assembly,
are linked closely to the WIP levels of the overall system and especially to those of the
final finished gear buffers. In order to insure gear quality, inventory levels should be
maintained below reasonable maximums otherwise corrosion and the potential for
significant quality "spills" can result. In addition, having the right mix and quantity of
parts available to the customer is highly dependent on maintaining minimum inventory
levels to allow for the significant total system throughput time (V2 day) and safety factors
for downtime. Also, variation in WIP levels is directly related to run sizes, which should
be minimized (to the extent possible) in pursuit of the ultimate goal of lot and run sizes of
1 part.
As shown in Figure 4-15, the standard deviation in the overall-system inventory levels
was reduced substantially for manual gears (30%) and slightly for automatic gears (7%).
As can be seen in the manual curve, the after curve (bold line) significantly truncates the
long "tail" on the before curve (dotted line) at the high end (some parts in the 15-23 days
range). Also, the average inventory level reduced slightly for both styles. This data
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provides an indication that standardization of the overall inventory levels was somewhat
successful.
Figure 4-15 Manual and Auto Gears -- Before/After Total Inventory
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The buffer which immediately precedes the customer for all gear types can be viewed as
most critical, in order to meet the primary delivery objectives to the customer (i.e. to
avoid shutting them down). Figure 4-16 provides the before and after results in inventory
levels for this buffer. The standard deviation improved considerably (30%) for both
manual and automatic gears, with a slight reduction in the average inventory level.
Figure 4-16 Manual and Auto Gears -- Before/After Pre-Assembly Inventory
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These results indicate a pronounced improvement in standardization of WIP levels at the
final stage of the gear machining system and limited improvements in the overall system
inventory variation. This data is encouraging because the implementation was not
without issues. For example, in some cases the inventory limits established with the new
system were not followed simply due to lack of support from production operators. With
the renewed support mentioned previously, further improvements in WIP level
standardization are expected. Continued WIP level standardization results should prove a
more robust system and insure better delivery to the customer (i.e. less customer
downtime) in the future, as well.
4.6. Recommendations
This section includes an overall comparison of the implemented CONWIP system to
sequential pull (kanban with SWIP) throughout since a progression toward a simpler
kanban with SWIP approach is the next step for the facility, in the author's view. Kanban
with SWIP provides the best fit with the overall manufacturing system objectives but
needs to be accompanied by run size reduction.
4.6.1. Shortfalls in the Implemented CONWIP System
It is important to recognize the failures of the implemented system with respect to the
primary objectives. First, as shown in the results, the system did not meet the customer
demand (right quantity, mix, and quality) as some customer downtime remains from the
gear manufacturing system. One example of this shortfall is in the system's slow
replenishment of "fallout" or defects. Since CONWIP does not provide safety stock at
each process, any defects must be accounted for in the safety stock allocation at the final
process stage, immediately preceding the customer. This safety stock protects the
customer, but does not allow intermediate processes to quickly recover from defects. For
example, any fallout is accounted for by a reduction in the inventory count on the next
shift. This will eventually regenerate the lost production by starting additional
production jobs at the first process, but the lag time for this replenishment is long.
Essentially, the orders to regenerate the safety stock are delayed by the throughput time
through the entire 4-process manufacturing system. In kanban, the safety stock
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replenishment would be triggered more immediately from the preceding safety stock
buffer and further upstream through its chain reaction fashion. Therefore, the safety
stock at the final process stage can be replenished quicker with kanban as opposed to
CONWIP, which requires larger safety stocks at the final process stage for CONWIP.
The material flow sheet also does not immediately spotlight problems as it is only
generated each shift, does not specifically pinpoint the root causes of problems, and does
not incorporate performance to takt time, as mentioned. For example, if a green gears
line misses a changeover on night shift, the problem will not necessarily be highlighted
until the subsequent shift when the line is clearly red in color and significantly below the
minimum changeover trigger. Then, to determine the cause of the shortage, the leaders
on the morning shift must pull the production report from the previous shift and then
inform their teams of the cause. If the night shift is off for their unscheduled five-days
(due to the rotational schedule), then the problem will be forgotten and never addressed
with the crew which "owns" the problem. This lack of immediate attention precipitates
cross-crew dissension, also, which becomes highly counterproductive. Alternatively,
kanban provides a more visual and "real-time" (i.e. continuous) signal about inventory
status and changeover necessity which is more easily monitored throughout the shift by
teams and leaders.
The inability to immediately show problems is also related to the fact that direct
information flow (between customers and suppliers) is not mandated through the
implemented CONWIP system, as opposed to kanban. For example, parts are placed into
subsequent buffers but production ordering or withdrawal kanbans do not circulate
between stages to indicate production information. In the implemented CONWIP
system, the material flow sheet is the primary means of communication between areas
through inventory counts and summary statistics for each stage. This primacy places
considerable emphasis on the accuracy of the material flow sheet and part counts
completed each shift. In fact, a fairly simple automated check-sheet was added to the
material flow sheet to monitor for errors in production counts, as mentioned previously.
The material flow meeting (to be discussed further, below) can also be thought of as a
"bandage" for the information shortfalls of the new system.
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The system's robustness to variation can be said to have improved as the ability to reduce
WIP variation indicates better run size standardization. However, robustness is limited
because, as system variability occurs with CONWIP's limited system inventory, the
scheduling decisions for some equipment quickly become coupled across multiple
process stages. This complexity creates the need for a "material flow meeting" at the
start of each shift to evaluate scheduling decisions for the shift by simultaneously
considering multiple processes. The meeting provides verbal communication so that each
process/team understands the production plans of others. Kanban with SWIP eliminates
significant complexity through its SWIP between each customer-supplier link. This
allows adjacent processes to operate with more autonomy and creates a simpler system.
More indirectly related to the system objectives, the implemented system does have
evident waste. As mentioned previously, the CONWIP system requires inventory
tracking, which, in this case, is completed by physical counting and computer generation
of a material flow sheet on each shift. The wasted man-hours for counting parts and
scheduling the system equate to approximately $135,000 per year (estimated at 6
people/shift, 45min/shift, 2shifts/day, 6days/week, 50weeks/year, and $50/hour overall
burden rate). Therefore, the simple kanban system would be much easier to facilitate
given the functionally based teams.
4.6.2. CONWIP/Kanban WIP & Floor-space Comparison
The limited floor-space and dunnage in gear machining coupled with the higher inventory
requirements of kanban with SWIP (versus the implemented CONWIP system) is the
primary reason that a kanban approach was not implemented. This relates directly to one
of the objectives of the project in that the system had to be implementable within the
project timeframe. However, further efforts toward run size reduction are needed as
reduced run sizes are a key enabler of a simpler kanban system. This section provides a
detailed comparison of the implemented approach (referred to as CONWIP in the figures)
and sequential pull (referred to as Kanban in the figures) over various run sizes. This
analysis is provided for further evaluation by the gear machining area in making future
improvements and progressing toward kanban.
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Figure 4-17 shows a marked difference in average inventory levels for the complete
system between the kanban and CONWIP approach. This difference is due to the
extensive inventory required by establishing SWIP between each customer-supplier link
for every part type. In contrast, the implemented CONWIP-like approach only requires a
complete SWIP after the final stage of the process (i.e. all parts are always available to
the customer). This overall average inventory comparison is useful when considering the
primary objective of "right quality" to the customer. As the inventory levels are directly
related to the lead-time through the manufacturing system, one must consider the lead
time impact on corrosion issues (especially a problem in summer months) and risk of
significant quality "spills."
Figure 4-17 CONWIP/Kanban -- Average Inventory Levels versus Run Size
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Figure 4-18 shows the inventory floor-space requirements, which present a similar
CONWIP/kanban difference; however, the difference is not as large because CONWIP
still requires a fair amount of inventory floor-space to accommodate the large run sizes.
Although, CONWIP still requires substantially less floor-space because only enough
floor-space for the cycle stock (not safety stock) is required at any given stage due to its
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holistic view of the system. For example, a "safety stock" is only required at the final
finished gears buffer, while a SWIP minimum level (or safety stock) is necessitated at
every customer-supplier link in order to provide fallout replenishment and equipment
downtime coverage.
Also, another advantage to CONWIP, which is not fully shown in Figure 4-18 is its
ability to facilitate sharing of material dunnage (racks or carts) rather than specifying
them as dedicated to one part type. Sharing of dunnage across multiple part types can
save substantially on inventory floor-space requirements. The graph does not fully
account for this non-specific dunnage requirement, but partially considers it by assuming
only a 12% dunnage sharing. In actuality this "dunnage sharing" factor could be much
more substantial. For example, on a two-part line in Green Gears (at the beginning of the
process) with run sizes of 5 days, the dunnage required with kanban might be 8 carts for
part "A" and 8 carts for part "B." With CONWIP, however, only 8-10 carts total might
be required. The CONWIP system allows the inventory level, at this beginning process
stage, to be zero on some part types. By effectively shifting these unused carts from one
part type toward use for another, fewer total carts and less total floor-space are required.
In fact, the production operators in Green Gears implemented this methodology near
completion of this project. The green gears' carts had been previously part-type specific
and at times, carts and dunnage (racks) were at a shortage; however, by sharing carts and
dunnage, less was needed. This dunnage sharing should only be considered as a
significant factor, though, if floor-space is scarce; the overall system's performance to the
manufacturing system's objectives should be the primary concern.
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Figure 4-18 CONWIP/Kanban - Inventory Floor-space Allocation versus Run Size
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Another critical consideration in evaluating floor-space requirements is the range of
inventory levels when evaluating only an individual buffer for a given part type. As
shown in Figure 4-19, the CONWIP to kanban difference is only in the safety stock or
minimum SWIP level (assuming no dunnage sharing). CONWIP would allow an
individual stage's buffer to drop to zero (for all buffers except those immediately
preceding the customer), while kanban would only allow it to drop to the safety stock
level (assuming a non-zero minimum SWTP level). This difference, when accumulated
across 28 different part types in 3 (excluding the final buffer since CONWIP has a similar
safety stock) different SWIP stages, is the reason that kanban requires too much floor-
space, given the facility's current run sizes of 5 days of demand.
In regard to all aforementioned figures, the safety stock assumptions define the minimum
inventory levels for both CONWIP and kanban and as can be surmised from the figures,
the safety stock is held constant above a given run size. For CONWIP, this assumption is
based on the remaining process time in the system and affected considerably by the
minimum lot transfer size, which is assumed constant above a run size of 4 days demand
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(note: run sizes of 5-days demand are average for gear machining). For kanban, the
safety stock is defined as one full cart of a given part type at each major process and
assumed constant above run sizes of 1.5 days.
Figure 4-19 CONWIP/Kanban -- Maximum Individual Buffer Size
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It is worthwhile to mention that while the maximum individual buffer sizes are similar
and the range is the same for both CONWIP and kanban for an individual part's buffer,
the average level for the same buffer is actually quite different (between CONWIP and
kanban). For a run size of 5 days, the average buffer is 1.3 versus 3.7 days of demand for
CONWIP and kanban, respectively. In general terms, this difference is due to the
system-wide view of CONWIP as it is concerned less with maintaining individual buffers
at standard levels and more focused on maintaining overall system inventory at specified
levels.
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4.6.3. Summary of Recommendations
While deficiencies are evident in this new system with respect to the manufacturing
system objectives, nonetheless, it did provide incremental continuous improvement given
the immediate constraints in the system. Through standardization of WIP levels coupled
with a holistic view of the system, it provides an approach which deals with current large
batches and equipment variability. However, the policies failure to meet the functional
requirements of the manufacturing system must be recognized. By further setup time
reduction activities, significant run size reductions can occur, which can lead to the
feasibility of kanban with SWIP implementation.
A kanban system has been shown to have higher overall inventory levels than CONWIP
and associated inventory dunnage and floor-space requirements that exceed availability;
however, the simplicity of it combined with its natural fit with Saturn's team structure,
would make it much more ideal. It would allow individual teams to decide what to run
based on their individual buffer levels and thereby operate more simply while giving
more autonomy to the teams. Gear productions' relatively stable demand pattern caters to
a kanban with SWIP approach, also. However, the organization must also consider
quality (e.g. corrosion) and the impacts of total system level inventory on scrap risk. For
example, if defective parts from green gears cannot typically be detected until the
transmission is tested in General Assembly, then the total inventory and associated total
throughput time in gear manufacturing becomes of critical importance (i.e. an assembly
plant full of transmission rework is costly). Therefore, any SWIP approach that adds
inventory to the overall system needs to be coupled with careful scrutiny on quality
procedures and resolution of process problems.
In summary, a kanban system's simplicity and ability to meet the manufacturing system
objectives make it an ideal next step for gear machining. The system could readily insure
that customer demand is met (right quantity, mix, and quality) through its simple yet
reliable daisy-chain fashion of information flow. It also shows problems immediately
through its visual form, is robust to variation through its uncoupling of adjacent processes
through SWIP, and is improveable and forces improvement. This last point is probably
the most important as kanban creates a simple system which is easy to improve but also
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forces improvement in the entire manufacturing system through its visual nature and fast
spotlighting of problems.
5. Conclusions
5.1. Continuous Improvement Insights
5.1.1. Observed Dynamics
The dynamics of continuous improvement are often complicated. A "worse before
better" tradeoff occurs at the outset, uncertain worker effort and attitudes are clear
foundations, and a tendency to focus on defects rather than process problems can
undermine the effort. The hands-on experience of the author with the kaizen process at
Saturn allowed further understanding of these dynamics.
The "worse-before-better" tradeoff was exemplified through an example of a kaizen
project in the shafts area. The work of the kaizen team, of which the author was a
member, had required some downtime of a grinding machine on the first day, which was
in part responsible for poor production performance in the shafts area for a given shift.
The resulting action by the production leaders to avoid further production losses was to
limit the team's access to the grinder on the second day. This example illustrates the
point of initial productivity losses before improvement activities were given the chance to
take-hold (i.e. stopping the grinder for improvement work clearly reduced production).
In addition, this example illustrates the difficult issue of worker effort and attitudes. On
the second day, the attitude and output of the kaizen team members deteriorated as the
efforts were (really only slightly) circumvented. Also, as observed during the internship
and felt first-hand, an even bigger issue with worker effort and attitudes seemed to be one
of support. In many cases, production workers would get "fired-up" during the kaizen
week and would plan to continue the activities during their normal work hours.
However, when they would express ideas and wait weeks for implementation, their
enthusiasm faded quickly. The author encountered this directly, also, as his work as a
kaizen team leader placed him in a position of responsibility for continuation and follow-
up on numerous ideas from the kaizen week. With other important projects of his own
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and issues of support for implementation work, he, too, was unable to deliver on the
numerous good ideas which were proposed (but not implemented during the 1-week
kaizen).
A focus toward defects rather than true process problems was more difficult to observe,
but apparent. In many cases, daily problems were corrected but process problems were
never truly root-caused and resolved. This was, in part, a support issue as engineering
and maintenance support was limited, plus production operator and leadership effort
often shifted to other "fires." However, the lack of root cause resolution seemed to be, in
large part, due to the general difficulty in solving the problems. The lack of
standardization and the extreme complexity of some operations add to the difficulty in
root-causing problems. Also, issues related to poor changeovers are difficult to solve
because further training cannot guarantee complete resolution, expensive tooling
investments are often unrealistic, and a solution of more inspection adds waste in the
system.
In some cases, the interplay of these dynamics was driven by the realities of an
organization focused on short-term performance, with its future clearly "hanging in the
balance." For example, they could not put limitless resources (through overtime) toward
kaizen or afford production losses because budget and productivity performance were
being scrutinized as future product commitments were sought. Also, in the case of
difficulty in establishing lifetime resolution of process problems, the issues were, in part,
due to the extreme complexity of some of the manufacturing equipment and, in many
cases, the extensive material handling systems and their inherent instability. For
example, a loader (material handling "pick and place" device) which was nicking gear
teeth was repaired for a misalignment problem; however, the handling equipment's
integrality with the machine design did not provide any economical means to replace or
eliminate the device to provide lifetime elimination of the issue.
5.1.2. High Leverage Points
There are four key points which frequently occur in literature regarding continuous
improvement and are very applicable to the state of this organization. The 1st point is to
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focus on process problems, not defects. As Repenning and Sterman (1997) establish "the
high leverage point for improvement is allocating effort to reducing the stock of process
problems, not defect correction or capacity expansion." This "stock" of process problems
is a system dynamics view of equipment as having a given amount of process problems
which is reduced through continuous improvement focused on these issues. They
illustrate the failure of some process improvement efforts as attention shifts from process
problems to a focus on correcting defects or avoiding process problems altogether and
investing in additional capacity. Also, they show, from a system dynamics analysis, that
the critical factors in process improvement are both this focus on process problems and
also a focus on experimentation, the 2 key point. As one plant manager cites, "...the
best thing we did was that we didn't kill anybody when they shut down the line"
(Repenning and Sterman, 1999, p. 35). This focus on experimentation was also
enumerated continuously by the Shingijutsu consultants, based on the author's
experience. In addition, Spear and Bowen (1999) maintain that one of the 4 basic rules
underlying TPS is "how to improve," which is Toyota's explicit method of teaching
people how to improve and solve problems using the scientific method. They state
"..workers were assigned a leader who trained them to frame problems better and to
formulate and test hypotheses.. .to use the scientific method" (p. 6).
The 3 rd continuous improvement point is also explained by Spear and Bowen as follows.
"..all managers are expected to be able to do the jobs of everyone they supervise and
also to teach their workers how to solve problems according to the scientific method.
The leadership model applies as much to the first-level 'team-leader' supervisors as it
does to those at the top of the organization" (p. 7).
This 3 d point is a critical high leverage point, in the author's opinion, as the organization
needs to focus on the development of managers' capabilities to lead and teach problem
solving. Rather than assigning engineers or other resources as leaders for kaizen, the
managers need to be the ones taking the leadership role. They are clearly in the best
position to lead the change, with the most direct interaction with the shop floor issues and
people. Maccoby (1997) provides insight from the lessons of NUMMI, the joint-venture
GM-Toyota plant, and maintains that "U.S. workers respond to leaders who teach useful
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skills and business perspectives, communicate market and process information and
reasons behind decisions, and facilitate problem-solving scssions" (p. 170). What better
way for leaders to earn the trust and respect of their subordinates than by working with
them daily to solve problems?
The 4 h item is the ability of the manufacturing system design to highlight problems and
force root cause improvement. This can be viewed from a machine design or processing
standpoint as excessive conveyor systems (such as those in Saturn gear machining) create
a means to hide problems and waste, while U-shaped cells with minimal inventory allow
visibility of the entire process for clear attention to issues. Also, from a material and
information flow standpoint, previous citations in this thesis provide a good example as
kanban's more (in comparison to CONWIP) visual and direct information flow creates
more immediate detection and clearer identification of problems.
These 4 key points, while not providing easy answers to the complex issues of continuous
improvement, do provide high leverage solutions. However, development can best occur
by considering these solutions and questioning the state of one's organization. For
example, the issue of managers leading improvement reveals a question, which many
organizations need to address: "What behavior do you reward? Is it the managers who
are the best problem solvers that get the praise and promotions or those who can "fight
the biggest fires?"
5.2. Keep It Simple
Sometimes abbreviated KIS, the "Keep It Simple" motto provides a good summary of the
methodology used in this project. In the author's view and as applied to this new material
flow sheet, the complexity of considering setup times and managing multiple parts of
equal priority can be accounted for by leaving this task to people who have the best
knowledge of the overall manufacturing system and its capabilities. By maintaining a
system which empowers people, production team members and leadership, to collectively
decide on the means to best address the extenuating circumstances, the overall policy
remains simple. This simplicity proved important to aid buy-in and understanding by the
production team members and leaders for the new process. Also, it speeded
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implementation time as a more complex algorithm would have required significant
system linkages and information systems support; these linkages might not have been
possible given the limited timeframe. Finally, the end result should be better as operators
and leaders "work through" issues, take ownership, then (hopefully) follow this with
continuous improvement.
5.3. Functional Layout Perils
As Repenning and Sterman (1997) maintain, "functionally based organizations often
optimize the pieces at the expense of the organization's objectives" (p.45). In a more
specific context, a functional layout of manufacturing equipment has been upheld as a
vestige from the early days of mass production. The Toyota Production System replaced
this layout with a cellular approach having operations grouped according to product flow
rather than operational function. The Saturn gear machining area is not split functionally
to the extent of many manufacturing systems. For example, each part type typically
follows one production path through gear machining (as opposed to a job shop, multiple
flow path system). Although, its somewhat functional layout, with definitive green,
weld, heat treat, and grinding processes and associated production team structure,
provided firsthand insight into the problems of a functional layout. A couple key issues
were observed including a lack of communication across functional areas and an, albeit
natural, tendency to "protect one's turf."
The lack of communication was evident when, during a material flow meeting (prior to
the implementation stage of this project), the author told an operator from green gears
that the changes were intended to improve delivery problems to the green gears
customers (heat treat and weld cell). The operator countered with a surprised look but
honest tone and said, "what problems?" "People say that we have delivery problems."
The author then explained further the numerous complaints and finger pointing toward
green gears from several different areas; all of these complaints were seemingly unknown
to this operator and many others in green gears. This type of ignorance to the issues of
other areas was common and is a result of the system design.
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The other common behavior was to protect one's "turf." This behavior, while
exemplified in all organizations, seemed more pronounced because adjacent processes,
which were highly dependent on each other, often didn't know or necessarily care what
impact their decisions had on subsequent processes. For example, overproduction and
underproduction were core problems, which actually resulted in this project. These
issues were not necessary due to ill-minded efforts toward local optimization, rather they
were, in part, due to complex part flow paths that were functional in nature and facilitated
local optimization.
Some organizations are forced to deal with their functional layout because it's simply
infeasible to "tear out" the old and start anew. However, by at least optimizing the
existing system, significant improvements may result. For example, the organizational
structure may actually be more flexible than the manufacturing equipment. If the
organization can be oriented around product flows rather than functional areas, then
improvements could result. For example, in the case of the gear machining area, one
issue is a seemingly unnecessary functional structure even within the green gears area.
The green gears process starts with a lathe operation which is coupled to the green gears
lines by conveyor. However, the lathe operators are not part of the green gears
production team. Needless finger pointing is the result, as the green gears operators
blame the lathe operators for not producing enough parts and the lathe operators blame
the green gears operators for not changing-over at the right times. While both of these
issues are real, the finger-pointing rarely facilitates any improvement. In fact, the finger-
pointing is often indirect such that these teams are not necessarily aware of each others'
issues (a learning point which resulted from the material flow workshop).
Another functional layout problem that may be "fixable" is to rationalize part flows or
group parts into families in order to simplify part flow paths. As mentioned previously,
the complex part flow paths create significant scheduling issues as scheduling decisions
between a multitude of equipment are tightly coupled (i.e. must consider what machine
"A" is running when deciding what to run on machines "B, C, and D"). Also, as can be
explained from queuing theory, the disordered product flow combined with part shortages
from upstream equipment can easily create numerous changeovers and inefficiency
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downstream. By rationalizing part flow paths and then potentially coupling this change
with an organizational change to create product family champions or team structures, a
more productive system could result. According to the author's investigation in the gear
machining area, revising part flow paths might require significant expense; however, in
some organizations it might be more feasible.
Through more and better presented information from the new material flow sheet and
establishment of the material flow meeting on all crews, the communication and
information flow across existing functional areas has improved. Also, the primary intent
of the material flow sheet is to provide a tool to better manage the complex part flow
paths and circumvent local optimization at the expense of the overall manufacturing
system (and, thereby, the end customer). By thorough consideration of the perils of
functional layouts and organizational structures, current manufacturing systems can be
improved and design for new systems can avoid the problems altogether.
6. Next Steps
To summarize, there are a few issues with the implemented system as it fails to meet the
6 primary functional requirements of the manufacturing system. These issues including
the following:
* Downtime to the customer (i.e. "non-catastrophic" downtime) still occurs.
" Slow replenishment of process fallout.
" Inability to immediately highlight problems for root cause/resolution.
* Lack of direct takt time linkage for pacing.
* Primacy of the material flow sheet rather than direct information flow between
adjacent processes.
" Complexity through coupled scheduling decisions across multiple processes (i.e.
green gears needs to understand what weld cell is producing, etc.).
" Inefficiencies associated with manually counting parts and scheduling.
These problems are best addressed by kanban (i.e. sequential pull, ref. Figure 6-1). Its
simplicity and ability to meet the functional requirements will result in a more stable and
more improveable manufacturing system. However, run size reductions and associated
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setup time reduction activities should precede its implementation. Once run sizes are
reduced enough to meet floor-space and dunnage constraints, the implementation can
occur in pieces but starting from the process nearest to the customer. The changes should
start closest to the customer to insure that downstream processes are not over-pulling
kanbans (with larger run sizes than upstream processes). For example, hard grind, which
immediately precedes the customer should be the first to implement run size reductions,
then heat treat. Through a staged approach, the risk of implementation oversights will be
significantly reduced and "small" successes can be used to "sell" others on the system.
While the implemented policy provided some improvement and level of standardization,
a kanban system would likely return much bigger improvement rewards. In addition, it
should provide a better long-term, improveable system which can serve as a baseline for
use in Saturn Powertrain's future manufacturing system designs.
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Figure 6-1 Recommended Sequential Pull System (Kanban with SWIP)
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